Hyponoic Mechanisms

HYPONOIC MECHANISMS, a term belonging to Kretschmer and standing in close connection with the hypothesis of the layered structure of the functional apparatus of the nervous system, particularly its mental functions. This layering, however, must be understood to a large extent figuratively, and depends on the phylogenetic age of individual mechanisms, which were superimposed on one another as they developed over generations, so that now the most ancient of them are simultaneously the deepest. Under normal conditions, the mental life of a person is most colored by the activity of the latest developed and therefore higher-lying apparatuses of logical thinking; only if the functional capacity of these apparatuses is weakened in some way, do the deeper layers become exposed and come to the forefront. The latter, when beginning to work in isolation, reveal a completely different type of functioning, which in many ways approaches the type that predominates in the mental activity of primitive peoples. The "deep" mechanisms that give rise to this archaic type of functioning, Kretschmer calls hyponoic when it comes to the formation and combination of representations, and zipo-bulic (see) when it refers to a special character of emotional-volitional manifestations. According to Kretschmer, H. m. can be studied not only in pathological states, but also in the dreams of normal people, in the so-called "daydreams," which often represent the initial stage of artistic creativity, and finally in the mythology and art of primitive peoples. The most important feature of H. thinking processes is that they are katathymic, i.e., they are connected not by logical categories, but exclusively by the principle of affective commonality and correspondence to desires and fears (see Katathymia). Thus, in dreams, logical thoughts constructed in the form of propositions cease to arise first, and their place is taken by sensory images: what we thought in words during the day now passes before us in the form of a series of vivid pictures. If the dream is superficial, these pictures sometimes retain a scenic order, but with a deeper disturbance of consciousness, they break down into fragments of images rushing about in visible disorder. Under the influence of affective tendencies, these fragments, as Kretschmer expresses it, agglutinate, i.e., they are linked together into unique conglomerates of images. This agglutination occurs according to the laws of Freudian dream dynamics: condensations, displacements, repressions, etc. The resulting combinations usually have no logical meaning (in Kretschmer's expression, they remain asyntactic): they make no allowance for the law of causality, nor for space and time, the subject in them is often not separated from objects, etc. Instead, being connected by a multitude of the most diverse relations with the most current interests of the personality, they acquire in relation to the latter all the characteristics of symbols. Schizophrenic thinking, according to Kretschmer, is also largely based on H. m. It is distinguished by the fact that into the continuing fabric of functioning logical thinking, entering into the most bizarre combinations with it, are woven pictures and constructions characteristic of archaic-primitive perception of the world. In these pictures, as in dreams, asyntactic series of images predominate, combining with each other according to the principles of affective agglutination. Diverse symbols—products of unfinished thought—replace in them logically formed abstract concepts, and accordingly, the place of laws of causal dependence of phenomena is taken by the principles of magical action. Kretschmer finds manifestations of the activity of H. m. in hysterical twilight states and in the experiences of persons under hypnosis, as well as in the vague forms of undifferentiated thinking, which are characteristic of states of distraction and those often occurring with lowered consciousness, semi-twilight reveries that in artistic natures usually precede the crystallization of clear images of creative imagination. In Kretschmer's extremely interesting constructions, striking in the subtlety of analysis and richness of thought, however, not everything is indisputable. The most objections are raised against his basic idea, which identifies a number of pathological manifestations with normal forms of primitive thinking. These are phenomena of such different orders that it is hardly permissible to draw conclusions from one to the other exclusively on the basis of even far-reaching analogies. In any case, in modern psychiatric literature, the concept of H. m. is far from enjoying full recognition.