Psychology

PSYCHOLOGY, the science of the mental processes of the personality and their specifically human forms: perception and thinking, consciousness and character, speech and behavior. Soviet psychology builds its understanding of the subject of psychology on the basis of developing the ideological heritage of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the works of Stalin, the critical development of the history of the science of psychology and its contemporary trends, and the multifaceted participation of psychology in socialist practice. Already at the present time, certain paths toward solving this task are being outlined, specifically: a) understanding the subject of psychology as a "property of highly organized matter" (Lenin) that reflects objective phenomena of nature; b) understanding on this basis the mental processes and consciousness in their specific subjective function; c) affirming the unity of the brain and the psyche, the organism and human consciousness, created by the historical transformation of human nature; hence, considering the brain as the "material substrate of mental processes" (Lenin), and understanding the activity of these processes and their active role in the organism; d) understanding the personality (the object of psychology) and consciousness as "primordially historical products" (Marx) of social development, the history of the division of labor, and the class struggle (see Personality, Psyche, Behavior); e) understanding socialist practice as the main factor in the historical transformation of the working personality in the USSR. Such are the principal tenets underlying Soviet psychology, which is in close connection with the philosophy of dialectical materialism. This connection consists in the fact that: a) dialectical materialism is the only scientific methodological foundation for all cognition, and consequently for psychology; b) psychology and philosophy are connected in the history of their development, as a part to the whole, by general problems (consciousness, thinking, perception, sensation) solved by psychology on the basis of the theory of knowledge and logic; before the formation of experimental psychology, psychology constituted a branch of philosophy (along with logic, the theory of knowledge, ethics, etc.), which determined the connection of the history of psychology with the history of philosophy; c) this close connection of Soviet psychology with the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism cannot be understood as a one-sided dependence of psychology on philosophy. A remarkable example of dialectics in this regard was given by Lenin, who pointed to "those fields of knowledge from which the theory of knowledge and dialectics must be formed." These include: the history of philosophy, the history of individual sciences, the history of the mental development of the child, the history of the mental development of animals, "the history of language" + psychology + physiology of sense organs, which have theoretical-cognitive significance for philosophy itself, and consequently through it for all fields of scientific knowledge. Individual consciousness, studied by psychology, is not something by its very nature opposed to consciousness in the cognitive process, but itself is a necessary component moment of social consciousness and the cognitive process. No less essential for determining the place of psychology in the system of sciences is the question of to which category of sciences psychology should be attributed: to natural science or to socio-historical sciences ("sciences of the spirit," "sciences of culture"). The history of science has shown how psychology splits into "two psychologies" (see below) and how this fragmentation of psychology is considered the natural state of psychology (Dilthey). This position is theoretically substantiated by the Neo-Kantian classification of sciences (the division of sciences into groups of "sciences of nature" and "sciences of culture," for example in Rickert), while neopositivism turns it into a certain intermediate discipline (understanding psychology as a "bio-social" science, for example in de Roberti, Sorokin). Bourgeois ideology is characterized by the separation of society from nature, and the study of nature from society, and this is the main difference between the two psychologies. Soviet psychology sees in man neither nature divorced from history nor history taken separately from nature, but historical nature. Man acts upon nature through socially productive practice and in the process of this action changes nature. This change of nature by man is expressed in the creation of industry as a new objective reality for man himself. Labor and industry in their historical development have also transformed man's own nature. "History," wrote Marx, "is the true natural history of man," and at the same time, "history itself is a real part of the history of nature." The true place of human psychology will be found precisely in these sciences of historical nature, in the natural sciences of social man. Only in the light of these sciences is the only correct solution to the problem possible: brain and psyche, organism and consciousness. The natural sciences of man are capable of solving this problem on the basis of understanding that "the history of industry and the established existence of industry is the open book of human essential powers, sensuously present before us human psychology, which until now has not been considered in its connection with the essence of man... Psychology for which this book—that is, the sensuously real, most accessible part of history—is closed cannot become a truly substantive and real science" (Marx). The concrete content of the subject of psychology includes the basic categories of human mental development: perception and thinking, consciousness and character, speech and behavior. The isolation of these categories is based on the internal differentiation of psychological formations that interpenetrate each other, but are neither reducible nor identical. However, this does not mean the separation of various categories by a metaphysical boundary like the old traditional division (intellect, will, feeling). Between the basic processes in their unity there exists a definite subordination, interpenetration, and mutual transitions (for example, the transformation of sensation into perception, needs into interests), characterizing the relation of the personality to the objectively material world of nature and to its own social practice. On this basis, it is possible to distinguish: a) mental processes whose activity consists in the subjective processing of reflections of the objectively real world (sensations, perceptions, knowledge, thinking, and their functions: memory, attention, skill), forming the cognitive activity of the personality, its mental development; b) mental processes whose activity consists in the objectification of subjective states (activity and behavior: speech, act, expressive actions, etc.); c) mental processes having the character of central functions, realizing the unity of the personality and the multiplicity of its states, regulating and mediating all mental processes, forming purposeful, planned activity (consciousness, self-consciousness, character, and processes subordinated to them: temperament and affects, drives and instincts, etc.). These processes regulate and mediate mental development, activity, and behavior, constituting a measure specific to the personality of the relationship between the social and the individual in the development of psychology. The subject of psychology is constructed on the basis of understanding this whole in psychology in its internal diversity, differentiation, and interaction, without divorcing one form from another and without reducing one to another. The denial of the diversity of the processes of psychology leads to the vicious absolutization of some form and to the mechanical reduction of all the rest to it. Thus, traditional empirical psychology included only states of consciousness in the subject of psychology, and behaviorism only behavior; voluntarism reduced all psychological processes to will, and intellectualism to thinking. The broad possibilities of socialist reality and its demands create the opportunity for Soviet psychology to overcome the limitations of various schools and trends, unfolding on the basis of general psychological theory the entire concrete diversity of the subject of psychology. The sections of psychology according to which the specialization of psychological research is constructed are divided by objects that determine the specific direction and expression of psychological processes. Psychology as a scientific system consists of the following sections: 1. Theory and history of psychology, developing: a) the subject and method of psychology, its relation to related sciences, concrete tasks in socialist construction; b) the history of the science of psychology as a form of scientific ideology in connection with the history of philosophy and natural science. 2. General psychology, developing the concrete content of the general problems of psychology, which include the above-mentioned subordinate groups of psychological processes, including: a) sensation and perception, b) attention and memory, c) knowledge and skill, d) thinking and speech, e) consciousness and personality, f) temperament, character, giftedness, g) imagination and fantasy, h) drives, needs, interests, i) instincts, emotions, affects, j) will and behavior. In Soviet psychology, the problems of general psychology include questions constituting the so-called "individual," "differential" psychology, "characterology" on the one hand, and "social" psychology on the other. The isolation of the problem of personality into an independent section, opposed to "general" and "social" psychology, distorts the subject of psychology, depriving all other problems of psychology of concrete content, since the aspect of personality distinguishes psychology from all other related sciences studying social consciousness.

Also, there is no reason to single out "social" (or mass, class, collective) psychology, because a) "social" psychology substitutes for the doctrine of ideologies and represents the psychologization of social phenomena, that is, subjective bourgeois sociology; b) the "social" aspect cannot pertain to only one of the branches of psychology, being the internal foundation of all problems of psychology. Bourgeois psychology, built on an individualistic understanding of society, theoretically justified the split between the social and the personal in this division of psychology into "social" and "individual," making general psychology free from the problems of the interrelation between the personal and the social. Soviet psychology places the social understanding of personality at the basis of the subject of psychology, and therefore general psychology as the main branch of psychology includes not only the problems of personality, but also the problems of communication (the relationship of personality to personality, impact and evaluation in this process, the change of personality in the collective, so-called social feelings: sympathy, empathy, empathy-feeling, the psychology of fashion, imitation, etc.). The problems of personality and communication are studied on the basis of their direct dependence on the socio-economic relations of people, their class practice. In general psychology, cause-and-effect relations and relations in mental development are established, proceeding from the material regularities of the brain and the mode of interrelation between the individual and the social in the personality. Therefore, the problem of causality in Soviet psychology is solved differently than in mechanistic psychology, which denies psychological causality and reduces it to physiological connections. On this issue, Soviet psychology also opposes idealistic the science of the spirit, which denies causality in psychology and recognizes in psychology only the movement of meanings and significances. Therefore, psychology has the opportunity for the correct diagnosis of mental qualities, that is, specific states of mental processes conditioned both by the mode of functioning and by the content of what is experienced, and the significance of this for the personality. Mental processes have a certain uniformity, relative stability of the connections and relations specific to a given form. The aforementioned constitutes the constant as a definite, relatively uniform set of features characterizing a given type of process (for example, the constancy of color sensations for developed normal vision) with the necessary individual deviations from the average modal, probable value. The measure of the relation between quantity and quality in psychology is revealed in the external manifestations of quality, intensity, duration of processes, in the modes of their functioning, and in their semantic content. The study of these moments constitutes the knowledge about the symptoms of psychological processes as typical manifestations of certain functions and experiences (for example, the symptoms for the intellectual function are objective or speech operations, for emotions—mimic-gesticulatory, psychomotor tremor, etc.). The symptomatology of mental processes constitutes the most important task of general psychology in the study of various types of mental processes. For this purpose, not only quality, intensity, and duration in their causal basis, mode of functioning, and semantic content are taken into account, but also their periodicity. The latter is established both in relation to the sequence of state changes (for example, a known rhythm of psychomotor and affective life, contrast states of experiences, fatigue and restoration of strength) and in relation to the division of the process into a number of stages it passes through. Studying the regularities, forms, and mechanisms of general processes, this section of psychology studies them mainly in connection with the practical-class activity of the personality, in connection with its bio-physiological features (heredity, type of nervous system, constitution), natural differences (age and sex), national-everyday and cultural-ideological conditions. 3. Genetic psychology, which investigates the main directions of psychological development, in accordance with which are distinguished: 1) Comparative psychology, or biological psychology of animals, studying the history of behavior and mental development of animals on the basis of the development of adaptive activity of animals and the evolution of their nervous system, in accordance with biological systematics. 2) Historical psychology, which elaborates the questions of: a) the genetic unity of man and animals and the qualitative difference of man from animals in connection with the problem of the socio-labor origin of man and his conscious activity; b) the psychology of primitive man, the qualitative features of the content and functions of his consciousness, behavior, thinking; c) the historical change in the psychology of man in connection with the history of the division of labor, class struggle, on the basis of the history of socio-economic formations (psychological features of the consciousness and behavior of the class personality of the slave-owning, feudal, capitalist formations, the era of socialist construction); d) ethnic psychology as the doctrine of national features of psychological development on the basis of historical materialism and Lenin's doctrine of the national policy of the party; e) the historical development of psychology in connection with the history of religion, speech culture, art, morality, and other forms of ideology. 3) Age, or ontogenetic, psychology, studying the formation and development of the contents and functions of psychology in the ontogenetic development of personality in connection with age stages and periods (infancy and early childhood, preschool and school childhood, transitional period, youth as periods of growth and intensive formation; differential analysis of the psychology of the adult, the psychology of old age). Age and child psychology are developed in direct connection with studies of the heredity of psychological features, their embryological conditions (e.g., experimental study of the psychology of twins), the social-everyday environment and upbringing, socio-practical activity and the ideology of the personality. The main section of this psychology is child psychology with the central problem: "The history of the mental development of the child" (Lenin). Child psychology is closely connected with embryology, genetics, pedology, child hygiene, etc. 4. Pathological psychology studies the pathological change and decay of psychological processes under various defective and pathological states (physical insufficiencies, various forms of oligophrenia), the decay of functions under various nervous-organic and functional-and mental diseases. An example of problems developed by this psychology can serve the psychological study of aphasia, with which the pathological change in the interrelation of speech and thinking is connected, the psychological study of schizophrenia, with which the specific form of the decay of the unity of personality is connected, etc. Pathological psychology is closely connected with medical psychology (see below). 5. Special psychology. In bourgeois psychology, there is a division of psychology into theoretical and applied. This division of psychology denies the peculiar regularities of concrete forms of impact on the personality and the social activity of the personality itself. The difference between the special psychology discussed here and the general one lies in the fact that special psychology investigates psychological processes in a specific direction as a result of special forms of social impact on the personality or specific conditions of the activity of the personality itself. This section of psychology studies special forms of impact on the personality in a sick and healthy state, in various living conditions and forms of activity.

Special psychology includes: 1) psychology of labor, or psychotechnics (see), industrial psychology, investigating: a) psychology of professions, b) psychology of occupational aptitude in connection with special abilities and the formation of occupational orientation, c) psychological factors of fatigue and recovery, industrial traumatism and safety engineering, d) psychological factors of production invention and the development of socialist forms of labor, e) methods and techniques of mental work; 2) pedagogical psychology, studying the psychology of pedagogical influence and the pedagogical process as a whole; Soviet pedagogical psychology studies: a) mental development of the schoolchild in connection with the assimilation of a system of knowledge, b) psychology of private methods and individual academic disciplines (e.g., arithmetic, language, physics), c) psychology of measures of influence in connection with the education of conscious discipline, d) psychology of the teacher and pedagogical assessment, e) psychology of polytechnical education, f) psychology of socially useful work at school, g) psychology of political enlightenment work (eradication of illiteracy and semi-literacy, library work, technical propaganda, agitation, etc.); it is also possible to include here the psychology of antireligious influences, which are of particular importance in connection with the tasks set by the party before the second five-year plan; 3) medical psychology; 4) military psychology, studying psychological issues related to military-political and military-technical work, tactics, and strategy; 5) forensic psychology, including: a) properly criminal psychology as the psychology of the criminal and the crime, the social conditions and psychological motives that gave rise to them, b) criminal procedural psychology as the psychology of judicial investigation, witness testimony, the trial, c) penitentiary psychology as the psychology of the offender after the adoption of measures of social protection against them (in connection with the problems of socio-political and judicial-pedagogical re-education); 6) artistic psychology, developing the psychology of various types of artistic impact (cinema, theater, music, etc.) in relation to: a) the psychology of the viewer, listener, reader (perception and understanding of artistic impact) and b) the psychology of artistic creation. - Special psychology in its various forms allows psychology to directly and diversely participate in socialist construction. Experimental psychology is not some special branch, since modern psychology (general, genetic, pathological, special) is an experimental science as a whole. Experimental psychology arose together with the works of Fechner and Wundt. Initially, its path consisted in applying the methods of natural science to psychology, especially in the problem of sensations, reactions, emotions, and skills. The first attempt to create an experimental psychology of thinking belongs to Binet and the Würzburg school (especially Bühler and Ach); the new experimental psychology of perception was created by gestalt psychology (Köhler, Koffka, Wertheimer). The experimental psychology of skills was created by Pavlov's physiological school, Bekhterev's reflexology (see), Thorndike, American behaviorism (see), etc. Psychotechnics, which created a new type of model and test experiment, proved fruitful for the development of the psychological experiment. Each branch of psychology, direction, and school created its specific methods, corresponding to the problems being developed. Hence the specialization of methods on certain sides of the studied phenomena, which creates their natural boundaries. Measurement plays a special role in the experiment. In the history of psychology (Wolf, Herbart, Fechner, Wundt), quantitative determination expressed mathematically was attached great importance. Examples of psychological measurement are psychometry (measurement of duration, strength, speed of reaction, sensation, perception, attention, etc.), as well as mentimetry (measurement of mental development, its degree through special test scales). Psychology possesses special measuring equipment, for example, for reaction speed (Hipp chronoscope, Jacquet chronograph, etc.), reaction strength (e.g., Kornilov's dynamoscope), equipment for automatic registration (via pneumatic transmission to a kymograph and Marey drums) of various psychological changes through organic changes. These techniques are especially typical of the expression method (Wundt, Mosso, and others), a variant of which is the so-called conjugate motor technique (Luria, Leontiev, Libedensky), which studies affective states through motor changes. Thus, for example, the following are used: a pneumograph for recording the breathing curve, a sphygmograph for the pulse, an ergograph for work, etc. This task is facilitated by exposure equipment specially adapted for the mechanical demonstration of stimulation in psychological experiments; these include, for example, tachistoscopes, devices for exposure for a short time, mainly for the study of perception and attention, built on the principle of a mechanically falling screen (Minnemann, Rupp, Nechaev devices). Measurement of sensations, e.g., optical ones, based on the study of the stimulation threshold is carried out using various color-mixing devices (Helmholtz-Rupp simple mirror-color-mixing device, device for colored glasses and Czerny's nuance-making instrument, etc.), setting in motion sets of circles of varying brightness and lightness. These sets for exposure equipment are composed of the so-called complicational material, which makes it possible to simultaneously or sequentially act with a complex group of various stimulations, changed depending on the task of the experiment. When studying attention, in addition to exposure equipment, Sommer's devices for graphic recording of measurements by means of registration in two and three dimensions (registration of movements of the frontal musculature of the mimicry of attention and finger musculature) are also used. The experimental psychology of memory has at its disposal Ranschburg's apparatus (a box with two electromagnets pushing forward an axis with a circle of exposed stimuli through a slit), Wirth's apparatus mechanically presenting a series of words for memorization, Müller's apparatus constructed of a kymograph and a screen with exposed tasks, special devices for mechanical and logical memory, meaningful, meaningless, mediated memorization (for example, the methods of Ebbinghaus, Müller-Schumann, Pelm's set of objects).

tasks of Leontiev and others). For the problem of thinking, there is a whole series of experimental methods (constructive material, verbal tests, Ach's set of figures for concept formation, a set of materials for objective thinking, etc.). The materials obtained through these methods are processed by qualitative and quantitative (variation-statistical) analysis. It is already clear from the above that the modern psychological experiment requires a special production and technical environment, a special laboratory equipped in accordance with the given type of experiment and the problem under study. A number of experiments (on the problem of sensations, perceptions, emotions, etc.) are based on complex and precise technology—measuring, recording, and signaling apparatus—and on the principle of relative isolation. A number of experiments (on the problem of thinking, personality, etc.) are carried out without special apparatus, but by means of special materials, and require equipment that creates the necessary psychological situation. Experimental methods in psychology are directly connected with observation, which has great importance in psychology in connection with the necessity of studying an active, integral personality and its manifestations in natural or experimentally created conditions. But in view of the fact that simple observation, even specially planned and organized, is subjective in nature and very prone to errors, special appropriate technical conditions of observation are usually created (which are served by: the translucent screen and the Gesell observation chamber, cinematography and photography of the subject's behavior during the experiment). A laboratory of this type is not built on the chamber-isolation principle, but on the dynamic change of experimental conditions, on the operation of things and signs in difficult and conflict situations. It creates production conditions for the clinical interview and for refined introspection, i.e., experimentally planned self-observation. The experiment in psychology is built on the organization of various types of psychological situations, which is accomplished by various laboratory designs. A psychological situation is usually understood as those external conditions of the laboratory and the experiment that affect the personality of the subject in one way or another. Classical experimental psychology and modern behavioral (see Behavior) schools understand the psychological situation as the relation of the personality to the surrounding conditions, having the character of adaptation, equilibration (the psychological situation as a set of irritations, stimuli). Hence the externally limited, technical understanding of the psychological situation. In reality, the psychological situation is always living circumstances that form the thinking, motives, and actions of the personality in a certain direction. Hence, the psychological situation in the experiment includes not only the experimental task and its technical conditions for the subject's behavior, but also certain interactions between the experimenter and the subject (as two main conscious social elements of the experimental situation) on the basis of the experimenter's planned influence. A number of methods based on the psychological situation strive to approach the clinical type of research in the sense of naturalness, versatility, duration, and accuracy of the applied measurements, experiments, and observation. This expands the framework of the psychological laboratory, transferring it as it were into the sphere of activity of the studied personality (school, factory, hospital, club, etc.). The materials obtained by the experiment and the observation and introspection associated with it are mathematically processed and theoretically analyzed on the basis of the methodology of the studied problem. Psychology and related sciences. Each branch of psychology possesses its own concrete connections with various sciences; however, one can single out those related sciences that are important for psychology as a whole. Besides philosophy, they include the following sciences: 1. Physiology of the nervous system in connection with the problem of the relation of psychology to the brain as the material substrate of psychological processes. Examples of concrete problems naturally bringing psychology closer to the physiology of the nervous system are: a) physiology of the sense organs and sensation-perception, b) physiology of the neuro-motor apparatus and psychomotorics-behavior, c) localization of neuro-physiological processes and the development of mental functions. Thus, for example, the connection between intellectual activity and the cerebral cortex, between the physiology of subcortical centers and affective life, becomes obvious. From this also stems the significance of psychology for the physiology of the nervous system, which will not be able to understand all the functional capabilities of the brain if it does not use the specific material of psychology. The neurologist cannot comprehensively investigate the problem of the localization of cortical activity processes or subcortical centers without using materials on the conjugate changes of psychological functions. It is also impossible to develop the physiology of the sense organs without the methods of psychology and its data on the qualities and functions of sensation and perception. The interrelation of psychology and the physiology of the nervous system is determined by the actual connections that exist between psychology and physiology in the problem of the brain and the psyche. 2. Biology (and genetics, general physiology, embryology, etc.) is connected with psychology in the following problems: a) psychogenesis (the emergence and development of the psyche in the process of the development of organic matter), b) biological laws of behavior and the psyche of animals as a means of their adaptive activity, c) relations between phylogeny and ontogeny in the development of behavior and psychology of animals and humans, d) inheritance of psychological properties and behavioral "mechanisms", etc. Hence, the significance of psychology itself for the comprehensive development of biological problems is also obvious. 3. Physics is a crucial discipline for psychology in the problem of sensation and perception. Sensations as specific subjective functions reflecting the physical world can be studied only in dependence on physical conditions (stimuli, their intensity, quality, duration), which at the time gave Fechner the basis to establish the psychophysical law with the help of physics. At the same time, the significance for physics of psychological optics and acoustics is undoubtedly important, as they single out subjective moments in knowledge about physical phenomena and eliminate possible psychological errors during physical-technical observations and measurements. 4. Social-economic sciences. Proceeding from the historical-class understanding of human psychology, the significance for Soviet psychology of historical materialism and the history of socio-economic formations is obvious, with the help of which psychology establishes concrete laws and stages of development of the individual's consciousness and thinking. For this same purpose, the history of language, the history of material culture, ethnography, and the history of ideologies in general are important. The significance of psychology for medicine is proven by the high development of medical psychology (see below) and pathological psychology. However, these disciplines have direct significance only for neuropsychiatric specialties, whereas psychology is also important for other branches of medicine. The most important general problem is the psychogenesis of a number of diseases, distorted by idealism, but having at its base the established fact of the real and active significance of psychology in the life of the organism and the fact that a disease of a particular organ or function is at the same time a disease of the personality as a whole. - Psychology is of particular importance for the treatment of diseases of the sense organs, insofar as it is based on the knowledge of their normal and pathological psychophysiology, using in particular these data for the analysis of the patient's reports. The establishment of objective symptoms of sensitivity disorders, dysfunction of the process, determination of the truthfulness of the patient's reports, and the exclusion of the possibility of malingering require the application of psychological methods in diagnostic practice. This should also be referred to the correct setting of auscultation and palpation, the factors of which are perception and attention and where errors are possible due to insufficient consideration of these factors by the physician himself. It has been shown (Schüssler) that, for example, weak noises immediately preceding and especially following stronger ones are not caught without a special culture of attention influencing this "listening". The experimental-psychological method of Marbe, applied in Roos's clinic, revealed pathological heart murmurs that should have been expected given the clinical picture, but were not perceived by the ear. The significance of psychology for studying the effects of various chemical substances introduced into the organism is also obvious. On this basis, Gregor proposes a special branch of science—pharmacopsychology. History of psychology. The two main trends in the history of psychology—materialist and idealist psychology—reflect the antagonistic relations of social classes in ideology, as a result of which materialist psychology, associated with natural science and atheism, has always served the ascending revolutionary class; idealism, associated with religion, has served and serves the ruling descending classes.

The history of psychology reveals the dependence of the stages of development of psychology on the history of socio-economic formations and the class struggle, specifically the connection of ancient psychology and abilities with the slave-owning formation, scholastic and rational psychology with the feudal, and empirical and experimental psychology with capitalism. However, this connection of the history of psychology with the history of the class struggle is given only mediately through the development of ideology as a whole. Therefore, for Soviet psychology in the elaboration of the history of psychology, the task stands of fighting against the idealistic separation of the history of psychology from the history of socio-economic formations and against the mechanistic reduction of the history of psychology to socio-economic facts. At the present time it is still difficult to give a truly historical-materialist analysis of the history of psychology in view of the complexity and underdevelopment of the question. In ancient psychology, three branches are distinguished: 1) psychotheology, or psychosophy, connected with religion and directly occupied with metaphysical questions about mental forces or abilities, about their origin and pre-existence, about the immortality of the soul, etc.; 2) psychobiology as the natural history of the soul, connected with natural science and materialist psychology; 3) psychognostics as practical knowledge of people on the basis of observations of their life. (In modern psychology, in Brentano, psychognosis denotes understanding, descriptive psychology; in Stern, the knowledge of people on the basis of the study of individual characteristics.) Almost all the first philosophers of Greece (4th-5th centuries) were materialists who did not isolate the subject from the object, did not contrast the soul with the body, or man with nature. The explanation of mental phenomena from nature for that period is represented by Empedocles. Materialist psychology was developed further by Democritus, Lucretius, Epicurus. Idealist psychology traces its origin to Plato, who placed spirit at the basis of the development of nature and man, and asserted the immortality of the soul. This psychology received its first systematic elaboration in Aristotle, who founded psychology as the science of mental forces or abilities, and Plotinus, who developed psychology in the spirit of ancient mystical natural philosophy. The founder of Christian psychology was Origen (1st century), who attempted to reconcile philosophy and psychology with Christianity, connecting ancient ability psychology with the doctrine of the "holy trinity and redemption." The proposition of Augustine (4th century) on internal experience, on the body as an obedient organ of the soul, and on the will as the creative principle of the soul are placed at the basis of all scholastic psychology. From the 13th century, under the influence of Arabian psychology and the Aristotelian psychology restored by it, the second period—the scholastic—begins. The founder of Arabian psychology, Avicenna (9th-10th centuries), who for the first time created an objectively empirical (with a large factual material) doctrine of the soul, proceeded from a physiological approach to psychology. In his works, physiological-associative tendencies are clearly expressed. Averroes (12th century) materialistically developed this doctrine, establishing consciousness as a product of bodily organs, and established a close connection between psychological states and physiological phenomena. The psychology of late scholasticism (13th century) utilized the huge factual material of Arabian psychology, noting its materialist theories, and connected it with the religious theories of Origen, Augustine, and the ability psychology of Aristotle. The largest representatives of this period are Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. The new psychology begins from the time of Bacon (16th century) and Hobbes (17th century). Bacon's worldview is directed with all its might against scholasticism and PSYCHOLOGY

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theology. He considered it necessary to separate psychology as a science of the facts of consciousness from theology and religion, believing it possible to transfer the regularities of the bodily world to the spiritual realm through induction, experience, and observation, objecting in principle to scholasticism, metaphysics, and syllogistics. Since Bacon, such a psychology, based on pure speculation rather than on experience, measurement, and observation, has been subjected to severe criticism as a speculative psychology standing outside of actual scientific, that is, empirical knowledge. Bacon's thought that the ideal of psychology is the mechanics of representations, similar to the mechanics of atoms, was developed in detail by Hobbes, who asserted that the rational soul is a subject of science, not of theology, and that an incorporeal entity is impossible. Each of the psychological processes, according to Hobbes, can be understood only on the basis of its material foundations. Locke provides proof that there can be no innate ideas in the soul and gives an analysis of mental activity, which receives its ideas from external experience (sensations, primary qualities) and processed internal experience (reflection, memory, differences, comparisons, complex representations, and other secondary qualities). In Locke's works, psychology is for the first time placed on the ground of experience and observation. In contrast to Locke's materialistic sensationalism-empiricism, Berkeley and Hume use sensationalism for subjective-idealistic and psychologistic purposes, moving reality into the interior of the subject. Hume was the first to formulate the law of association in its three forms: association by contiguity, similarity, and causality. During the same period (17th century) in France, psychological ideas were developed by Descartes, who attempted to solve psychological problems dualistically on an idealistic basis. According to Descartes, the main difference between the soul and the body lies in the fact that the essence of the soul is thinking, and the essence of the body is extension. Descartes abolished the ancient concept of the sensitive soul: he admitted only the thinking soul, which included sensation, will, and representation, and which served as the basis of human activity. Associated with Descartes are also the first attempts to analyze everyday thinking and, especially, the mechanical understanding of animal and bodily psychology. The works of Malebranche, a follower of Descartes, based on a large range of observations, had a great influence on subsequent psychology. Spinoza had an exceptional influence on the subsequent development of psychology with his materialistic proposition: "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." Spinoza resolved the psychophysical problem in the plane of monism, asserting that the states of soul and body are actions of a single substance of nature. At the same time, Spinoza animated all of nature, considering the psyche to be an initially given property of it, which made his concept devoid of developmental methods and a true understanding of the psychophysical problem. Spinoza treated all problems of human nature detached from history in its relation to nature. In his Ethics, Spinoza unfolded a cohesive psychological theory of affects and also provided a remarkable analysis of individual states of consciousness. The study of Spinoza's psychological ideas is one of the most important tasks in the elaboration of the history of psychology. If Locke destroyed the old psychology of faculties and the doctrine of the metaphysical essence of the soul, proposing to study mental phenomena and states of consciousness as directly sensuous facts, Leibniz in his psychology put forward the understanding of the soul as a creative unity forming apperception. Since then, the concept of apperception has constituted the principal weapon of German psychology against English associationist psychology. Wolff was one of the first to establish the theory of psychophysical parallelism and for the first time divided psychology into rational (investigating the foundations for everything accessible to experience, the essence and nature of the soul) and empirical (investigating the facts of internal experience). 18th-century French materialism, in contrast to Locke, recognized only external experience and the external environment, denied the independent existence of the soul, and asserted that the essence of psychology is constituted by physiological processes (Condillac, Cabanis, La Mettrie). The psyche as a physiological process of the brain and a function of the external environment—such is the position of French materialism, which opposed it to spiritualism and idealism in general with their immaterial psychic and internal experience. A vast amount of factual material (and for the first time, pathological material) served as the strongest instrument of French materialism against idealistic psychology. During the same period in England, the so-called Scottish school (Reid, Dugald Stewart) developed, attempting to base itself on "common sense" and to prove the regulative significance of associations for behavior, mind, morality, and judgments. English empirical psychology, continuing the philosophical concept of Hume, is the principal and completed form of the associationist understanding of psychology as an atomistic, naturalistic, and mechanistic understanding associated with natural science, physics (mechanics), and physiology. Consistently denying rational psychology and metaphysics, this psychology was based on observation and experience, analysis and induction, reducing complex formations to simple elements constituting the association of ideas. The founder of this school is Hartley, who regarded psychology as a "physics of the soul" built on the mechanics of nerves, and the association of ideas as a physiological connection. The principal elaboration of the empirical school was carried out by James Mill and John Stuart Mill in the 19th century. The former decomposed psychology into its constituent parts and constructed higher forms out of them (with the help of associations). J. S. Mill developed a method of analysis with an additional synthetic check ("mental chemistry"), believing that the properties of mental formations cannot be deduced from the properties of their elements. Subsequently, this proposition was developed by Bain, who combined the doctrine of associations with the concept of the activity of consciousness. Further, this psychology was elaborated by Spencer, who linked psychology with general biology, proceeding from the understanding of psychology as the relation between the physiological (internal) and physical (external) relations of an organism to its environment. The development of the intellect begins with reflex, passes into instinct and memory, and finally forms reason. This development is based on the connectedness of psychological processes proportional to the number of times the connection between corresponding external phenomena has been repeated in experience. Consequently, according to Spencer, the law of association becomes general for both the psyche and the brain, which allegedly justified the psychophysical parallelism upon whose positions he stood. The theory of development itself, elaborated by him, represents an unsurpassed example of the mechanistic understanding of psychological development; nevertheless, it was of great importance for the struggle against idealism for the idea of the evolution of the psyche in connection with the evolution of the brain. Subsequently, changing under the influence of German, American, and French psychology, English psychology mainly continued the line of development of classical associationism, distancing itself from Hartley's materialism and Spencer's materialistic elements, returning back to Hume and Berkeley, and utilizing chiefly the works of the Mills and Bain. German psychology. The new German psychology dates back to Kant, who makes internal experience the foundation of psychology, identifying the psychological with the empirical and subjective. Kant's critique of psychology demotes it from the central position in philosophy that it occupied in Leibniz. Kant sees the characteristic property of consciousness not in the possession of a certain content, but in activity that introduces a certain order, in connecting and separating, in similarity and dissimilarity. These methods, discovering unity in multiplicity, constitute the logical unity of consciousness, which Kant, following Leibniz, calls apperception. In Kant, psychology turns out to be separated from nature and elevated into a supersensory world, brought into communion with the divine being. Hence the assertion that psychology will never be a science in the proper sense of the word, since it is impossible either to apply mathematics to the phenomena of consciousness or to act experimentally upon other people. German classical idealism (Fichte and Schelling especially) opposed the "bound consciousness" in empirical and physiological psychology with their sensationalism and materialism. Thus, Fichte proclaimed that "psychology... is nothing," and Schelling called it "an almost extinct science." Hegel provided a completed dialectical conception of psychology in the plane of idealism, setting forth psychology immediately after the philosophy of nature, consisting of: a) anthropology, considering the subjective spirit in its direct unity with the body, or the soul as a natural essence (temperaments, ages, sex, sleep, waking); b) phenomenology of the spirit, considering the spirit at the stage of reflection in which the spirit appears (sensuous consciousness, intellect, self-consciousness, reason); c) psychology proper. Its subject is the spirit, manifesting itself theoretically as mind, practically as will, freely as morality. Every trait acquired by a man in development is merely a moment, a stage of the developing whole. The movement of one form to another is accomplished through the internal struggle of contradictions, the negation of the negation, and dialectical sublation. Hegel's conception of psychology was further developed by Rosenkranz, Erdmann, and Michelet.

A significant role in German psychology belonged to Beneke, who subjected the psychology of faculties to severe criticism from the standpoint of idealism and attempted to establish the living activity of psychology in its unity with nature. Beneke found the basis of psychology in internal experience and based ethics, logic, and so on upon psychology. Herbart considered it necessary to supplement internal experience with metaphysics and mathematics. Herbart applied mathematics in psychology, using as variable quantities the strength of representations and their duration, on the basis of which he created a statics and mechanics of representations, investigating their equilibrium and speeds in the interrelationship between the clarity and obscuration of representations. The multiplicity of psychological phenomena arises as a result of the interaction of representations, their displacement, pressure, and fusion. Feuerbach unfolded a number of brilliant psychological ideas in the assertion that "the secret of theology is anthropology," giving a materialist analysis of reflection, consciousness, and desires. The radical and atheistic character of these ideas limited their impact on official science. The group of 19th-century German materialists (Vogt, Moleschott, Büchner), "cheap peddlers of materialism," as Engels called them, contributed nothing new to psychology compared to French materialism, vulgarizing materialist psychology. The history of modern German psychology, and with it all of psychology, begins with a decisive turn (following the rejection of speculation and metaphysics toward supplementing simple observation and internal experience) to experimentation and measurement. Its founder should be considered Fechner, who used the observations of the physiologist Weber on sensations in their dependence on stimulation and set up a series of studies on sensations, the laws of their increase and decrease. The research was conducted in accordance with known conditions of stimuli, expressed by a mathematical formula, since threshold differences were regarded by Fechner as a quantitative transition of the same force. On the basis of experimental methods, Fechner established the comparative relation between the increase of sensations and the excitations that arouse them. The principle of analyzing sensations through the comparison of subjective phenomena with measurable bodily phenomena has belonged to the most important tenets of experimental psychology up to the present time. Fechner attempted, on the basis of the psychophysical law established by him, to re-found the theory of psychophysical parallelism from the standpoint of consistent idealism, but the significance of Fechner's work for the history of psychology lies in the fact that he was the first, contrary to Kant and Herbart, to prove the possibility of turning psychology into an experimental and natural-scientific discipline. Following Fechner's psychophysics, Wundt created his systematic physiological psychology, setting himself the goal of transforming psychology into an explanatory science, for which purpose he added experimentation and measurement to internal experience and observation (which give only description), having developed and created a number of methods that became classical for psychology (the methods of stimulation, expression, and reaction). To accomplish this task, Wundt considered it possible to construct the foundations of psychology by means of related sciences and especially physiology, and then anthropology, ethnography, the history of language, the history of myth and religions, and so on. Against the atomistic and quantitative understanding of perception by associationism, Wundt put forward an understanding of them as complex formations of the synthesis of sensations, yielding new qualities not contained in sensations, which he called "creative syntheses" of psychology. In accordance with the concept of apperception he was developing, Wundt transformed the concept of association, proceeding from his conception of the activity and unity of consciousness associated with his affective theory of will. He found the development of the higher forms of activity and unity of consciousness in the socio-historical development of mankind, in the history of religion and myths, language, arts, and so on. In accordance with this, Wundt created his "psychology of language" and "folk psychology," which, given the idealistic character of Wundt's conception, led him to the psychologization of the social sciences. Already in Wundt's own system, a deep contradiction was revealed between natural science and social sciences in the problems of psychology. The crisis of Wundt's psychology should be attributed to those works which are directed against this two-sidedness of psychology or against its theoretical substantiation. Dilthey, the founder of modern German psychology as a science of spirit, unsatisfied with physiological and associative psychology, sought that psychology which would be the basis of all sciences of spirit, consequently of history and culture. Objecting to explanatory and natural-scientific psychology with its atomism, naturalism, and mechanism, Dilthey contrasts it with descriptive and structural psychology as a science of spirit, investigating consciousness in its specificity, immediacy, and wholeness. This psychology studies the volitional historical personality in its experience of values, meanings, and senses. Descriptive psychology therefore studies language, religion, culture as active objectified systems of interaction of personalities, as individual-historical experiences of values having significance for the personality. Hence the idea of understanding and interpreting psychology, studying the objectified products of the development of spirit, the semantic contents of experiences. According to this, the psychologist must interpret the meanings and significances of mental experiences [this motif—the interpretation of psychological processes—is now developing in two different directions: in psychoanalysis (Freud) and in psychology as a science of spirit (Spranger)]. Subjective experiences, according to Dilthey, do not exist like things as cause-and-effect relations, but mean, possessing an internal, goal-directed meaning. From his point of view, by abstracting from meaning, trying to find the pure reality of experiences, psychology finds itself faced with a physiological process, just as by abstracting from the meaning of a word, one loses the word itself, remaining before the physical and physiological act. Dilthey's consistent idealism reduces history to ideology, introduces ideology into psychology, tears the psyche away from the brain, and contrasts nature with history. In this conception, the struggle of idealism against the naturalistic dualism of Wundt, who closely linked psychology with natural science and thereby objectively contributed to the strengthening of materialist elements in psychology, found its first reflection and strongest expression. One must also mention the consistent proponent of Feuerbach's views in psychology, Jodl, who left a two-volume textbook of psychology. At the end of the 19th century, functional psychology appeared, founded by Brentano, and subsequently by Meinong, Stumpf, and others, distinguishing two categories: a) the analysis of the content of consciousness, and b) the study of the function of consciousness, with psychology studying only the latter. The content of psychology is not the object of psychology, since the content of psychology is reality itself (e.g., physical phenomena as the subject of perception), or cognitive concepts with their logical regularity, ethical values, constituting as a whole the content, objective side of experiences. This content of consciousness is studied by the sciences of history, nature, logic. Psychology studies not this objective world or objectified spirit, but only the judgment about them, the directedness of thought to certain objects existing outside of thought, but thought of in the given representation. These acts are called intentional by their character of directedness to the object; they do not have a sensory character in themselves and constitute a special function, distinct from the content of consciousness and cognizable in the closed unity of the experiencing individual psyche. The subject matter of functional psychology constitutes experience outside of its mental content, those devices and means by means of which the thinking of the individual psyche is carried out in its intentional relation to the objects of thought. Lipps emphasizes here the activity of this relation in contrast to the passive or receptive character of the content of consciousness (sensations, representations, etc.). Functional psychology exerted its influence on the creation of a new experimental psychology of thinking (Külpe, Messer, Watt, Ach, Bühler, and others). Functional psychology is also an idealistic theory that tears thinking away from sensory experience, the form of mental experiences, and their function from objectively significant content, inasmuch as it investigates closed individual psychology. However, functional psychology created new experimental methods, attempted to delimit psychology from the theory of knowledge and logic, ethics and history, and physical sciences, fighting against psychologism in these sciences, in which lies the undoubted positive significance of this psychology. The contradictory, but rich in content development of German psychology and its division into two psychologies (explanatory and descriptive, psychology of content and psychology of function, and further general psychology and concrete psychology of the personality) essentially reflected all the main trends of psychological thought as a whole. The peculiar paths of French psychology were determined by French materialism of the 18th century, further by Comte's positivism, the clinical schools of Charcot, Bernheim, and others, and Durkheim's sociology. The direct connection of psychology with physiology goes back to La Mettrie and earlier (Condillac), and with medicine to Cabanis. These works exerted an influence on the psychology of Gall, the founder of phrenology and cranioscopy, and on Flourens, the founder of physiological psychology.

Geoffroy and Cousin defend idealistic views of man as a free creature, excluded from the mechanical determinism of nature. From this they wanted to create a psychology completely free from natural science. Comte spoke out against this, believing that psychology is a part of physiology—an objective science purged of introspection, based on the objective study of other people, animals, and brain manifestations. Positivist psychology was further developed by Taine and influenced the entire subsequent course of French pathological medical and physiological psychology. Ever since the time of French materialism, and further under the influence of positivism, psychology proceeded mainly in directions associated with natural science (Ribot, Rabaud, Pieron, Dumas, and others) and medicine (Ribot, Binet, Janet, Blondel, and others). Also specific to French psychology is "social psychology" (Tarde, Le Bon), associated with the bourgeois-sociological systems of Comte and then Durkheim (e.g., Levy-Bruhl, etc.). Social psychology directly reveals the class essence of all new psychology, not going beyond the bounds of bourgeois limitation even in the persons of its best representatives. Militant idealism, formal logic, the substantiation and justification of the bourgeois system are characteristic of all recent, but especially social and applied psychology. The emergence of the experimental psychology of childhood and the measurement of mental development owe their foundation to the remarkable works of Binet. Here one should also include Claparede, Piaget (Switzerland), who essentially adhere to French psychology. Bergson's recent idealism with its intuitionism and "creative evolution" did not exert a significant influence on the development of concrete psychology. American psychology begins its original history with the psychology of James, who devoted himself to the analysis of the uniqueness of psychic reality in all its concreteness and specificity. James is interested not in the similarity of ideas to reality, but in the difference of the facts of consciousness. He is also interested not in the correspondence of psychology with the external world (as associationism was interested), but in the correspondence of psychology to the physiological and biological features of the organism. Mental life is a continuous series of qualities experienced by psychology, forming a stream of consciousness. James emphasizes the active and processual character of psychology. In contrast to associationism, he asserts the selective character of consciousness, considering the stream of consciousness to be the primary datum of the psyche. James created not only a new conception of idealistic psychology, but also the philosophy of pragmatism: an idealistic system close to empiriocriticism, but bearing the typical features of the ideology of American capitalism. As a result of his work, James subjected the problem of consciousness in psychology to severe criticism, which further served, together with pragmatism, as the starting point for the further development of American psychology as the science of behavior (one of the heralds of which was Thorndike, the greatest of contemporary American psychologists, and the closest founders being Watson, Weiss, Lashley, and others). American psychology is now synonymous with mechano-physiological, neurobiological psychology (see Behaviorism). Dynamic psychology, the main representative of which is Woodworths, formulates its tasks of studying man from the standpoint of dynamics, work, processes of the organism with its purposeful orientation depending on the external environment and prior experience. Russian psychology before the revolution did not create a single original properly psychological conception. Therefore, Russian psychology was not a factor in the development of world psychological science (like the German, French, English, and American ones). The reason for this was the dominance in official university science of the Orthodox-autocratic reaction, vulgar religious-mystical idealism, generated by the social system of landowner-capitalist Russia. The most famous scientists in the second half of the 19th century were: Grot, Troitsky, Vladislavlev, Kavelin, Strakhov, who acted as interpreters and adepts of various Western schools. Next came Trubetskoy, Lopatin, representatives of militant idealism and spiritualism, Chelpanov. The latter established himself as an implacable enemy of materialism, which did not allow him after the October Revolution to enter into Soviet psychology, despite a number of attempts he made. The major neo-Kantian philosopher and psychologist Vvedensky did not create a conception of psychology with the exception of his "psychophysical law," which denied other people's animation and the possibility of objective knowledge of the psyche. A positive role in Russian psychology before the revolution was played by Lazursky's school, which produced a number of important studies relating mainly to individual problems of psychology (the problem of character, personality classification, personality study methods, etc.). The works of Nechaev with his propaganda of experimental and pedagogical psychology, and Rossolimo with his method of measuring the intellect, were also significant. The most major psychologist should be considered N. Lange, who combined in himself a rarity for a university psychologist of tsarist Russia: erudition, a natural-scientific outlook, and originality of thought. His work "Psychology" is the best in Russian literature. However, it was not these works that influenced world psychological science. The West knew Russian psychology not from these works, but from those schools that set themselves the task of criticism and consistent negation of psychology. It is extremely typical of tsarist Russia that precisely these schools did not belong to university science. This includes Bechterew's school, which, on the basis of positivism, Spencer's evolutionary empiricism, neurology and clinical data, created first objective psychology, then psychoreflexology, reflexology (see). Bechterew's school is known for its broad psychoneurological aspect and new experimental methods, concrete pathological and children's material; it particularly influenced the development of recent American psychology. The objective and mechano-materialistic character of this school (with a number of idealistic moments) at the time influenced the criticism of traditional psychology and the natural-scientific restructuring of psychology. This applies especially to the school of Pavlov, the greatest physiologist of our time, whose works, standing entirely on a physiological basis, despite his negative attitude toward psychology, are of extremely great importance for the development of the latter. The crisis of bourgeois psychology and modern psychology. Already in the example of German psychology, significant contradictions in the development of psychology are visible, leading to a crisis (under the guise of an external renewal of the science of psychology) already in the pre-war years, but especially after the war of 1914–18. This is not accidental, since the crisis of bourgeois psychology has a socio-political content, just like the crisis of the capitalist system and the ideology expressing it in general. The general crisis of psychology has gripped it from methodological foundations to experimental fact, bringing psychology closer to mysticism and theology, directly involving psychology in solving the political tasks of capitalism. Philosophy, theology, mysticism, and psychology cease to be separated, as they were in the years of the heyday of capitalism and experimental psychology. Psychology is once again turning into a chapter of official philosophy, into a handmaiden of theology and mysticism. Thus, at the 12th Congress of German Psychologists (1931), bourgeois psychology solidarized with neo-Kantianism (Cassirer), sympathetically listened to the Jesuit Przywara and Father Gruhn in their calls to reunite psychology and theology. Psychology directly converges with mysticism in a "science" called "metapsychology," which revives spiritualism on a "natural-scientific" and "experimental basis" and has united significant circles of famous psychologists, natural scientists, doctors (Richet, Santoliquido, Driesch, Maxwell, Roux, Courtier), having its international metapsychological institute in Paris. Pneumatology is reviving again, the science of man as a "religious animal" (M. Kerrow). All this is connected with the struggle against the growth of the proletarian revolution, against bolshevism in politics and ideology, merges with fascism, and politically activates the cadres of bourgeois psychologists. The pure "academicism" of psychology is being destroyed, and it is beginning to openly participate in the measures of capitalism to fight against the communist workers' movement. Imperialism is "substantiated" by the natural passion for capture and preservation, and the fight against bolshevism—by the preservation of the "objective spirit, personality, and culture." Major scientists (e.g., Buhler in Austria) conduct psychological (!) studies of the unemployed, and write "works" on the crisis of capitalism for the purpose of the psychological "substantiation" of various recipes for curing capitalism. Thus, the famous English psychologist MacCurdy publishes the book "The Psychology of Crisis: Mind and Politics" (1932, London), where on the basis of psychological analysis he assures that the future is gloomy for Germany and America, but England will get out of the situation because it possesses an aristocracy, which is the only way of organizing society. This entire process of the fusion of bourgeois psychology directly with politics, religion (especially in Germany and England), and financial capital (America) proceeds under the false banner of "renewing" psychology, liberating psychology from the "fetters" that Wundt placed on it, under the banner of the "social utility" of psychology. Nowadays, psychology "has begun to be demanded to satisfy aesthetic, philosophical, and religious needs."

"Psychology itself, no longer bound by any strict scientific method, is all too ready to satisfy these needs" (Bernfeld). And indeed, the new needs of capitalism are satisfied not only by so-called applied psychology, especially psychotechnics, which directly rationalizes the exploitation of personality and labor, but also by new theories whose struggle is directed against Wundt for the inconsistency of his idealism, a struggle against the elements of materialism in Wundt's psychology. The struggle against Wundt is also a struggle against the problem of consciousness, initiated even earlier by Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Bergson on the one hand, and James on the other. This struggle is waged along the lines of various problems: the problem of the unconscious, the problems of behavior, thinking and drive, holistically understood perception and experience. This struggle was opened by Freud (see Psychoanalysis), who gave psychology a great deal regarding the problem of drive; joining this struggle under various guises are Krueger (the Leipzig school of developmental psychology) with the conception of an initially given, primary psychological nebula, of internal goal-seeking acts, and McDougall with his "hormic" psychology. All of them completely deny the objectively material essence of consciousness and its historical-class nature, and they revive vitalism on a psychological basis. Functionalism, without denying consciousness, actually reduces it to experience and thinking; Gestalt psychology reduces it to perception, thinking, and affective-volitional life; behaviorism (see) reduces it to behavior. Psychology as a science of the spirit (Spranger, Klages, Müller-Freienfels) and its variants (cultural psychology, the psychology of life)—which grew out Dilthey's system with its understanding of developmental psychology as "the growing of the individual psyche into the objective and normative spirit of a given epoch" (Spranger)—carries this out by special means. Behaviorism also moves precisely in this direction of solving the problem of the relationship between the individual and the social, understanding the development of personality as continuous adaptation to the environment, as the complete subordination of the personality to the environment (the "objective spirit" of the Germans). This development takes place within the limits of unchanging environmental conditions (behaviorism) and social norms (German psychology). In this unification of opposing currents, one sees the unity of bourgeois psychology, which is presently waging a struggle against all the liberal remnants of the bourgeoisie's own democratic past, against the "freedom of the personality" once proclaimed by the bourgeoisie. This tendency in psychology reflects one of the features of the politics of modern capitalism (the destruction of the "democratic freedoms" of the press, speech, assembly, etc.). Nor do those systems constitute an exception which view personality as an empty abstraction, a certain "psychophysical neutrality" (Stern's personalism) or as actual nothingness, flitting between the consciousness of its own inferiority and the will to power, overcompensation (Adler's individual psychology). The multiplicity of contemporary trends must not blind us to the unity of bourgeois psychology. K. Bühler, in his work on the "Crisis of Psychology" (1927), himself states that outwardly opposing and hostile trends are in reality only aspects of a single psychology. O. Gumplowicz develops this same thought further. Characteristic of bourgeois psychology, whether idealistic or positivist in its methodology, are: a) the denial of the objectively material essence of the psyche and consciousness, or their reduction to vulgarly understood matter; b) the denial of the historical-class essence of the human personality; c) the reduction of the problem of consciousness to separate psychological processes (thinking, experience, drive, behavior, etc.); d) the detachment of psychology from natural science, or their identification, etc. These theoretical propositions are practically realized in the political intensification of the struggle against the revolutionary proletariat and the Soviet Union. True, of late a certain class differentiation has been observed in the camp of psychologists in capitalist countries, connected with the growing crisis of capitalism, the growth of Bolshevism, and the successes of socialist construction. The task of critically assimilating the positive moments in contemporary psychology that exist in spite of the methodology of its schools requires of Soviet psychology a differentiated approach to the trends of bourgeois psychology, and the maximum utilization of those of them that are connected with natural science (American and French psychology), with the clinic and medicine (Janet, Dumas, Freud, Jung, Adler), and with the elaboration of a number of concrete problems: behavior (behaviorism), perception (Gestalt psychology and the Leipzig school), thinking and speech (Bühler, Ach, Blondel, Piaget, Bleuler, Lévy-Bruhl, and others), drive, need, and personality (Freud, Kurt Lewin, Janet, Adler, Stern, and others). However, the critical reworking of bourgeois psychology is only one of the sources for the development of Soviet psychology. In the USSR, psychology builds its content and methods as a truly materialist science, holding in its hands the only correct path for the development of psychology as a whole, and it develops on the basis of a struggle on two fronts (against mechanism and Menshevizing idealism). Until 1923–24 (the 1st and 2nd Psychoneurological Congresses), there were no significant changes in Soviet psychology: Chelpanov's group worked in Moscow, while in Leningrad Bekhterev's school (Stirtman, Shelovanov, Myasintsev, Osipova, Sorokhtin) and Pavlov's followers in psychology (Ivanov-Smolensky, Lenz, Savich), along with Basov's psychological group, deployed a critique of idealistic empirical psychology from mechanistic positions. The struggle against empirical psychology significantly strengthened the influence of the Leningrad schools of Bekhterev and Pavlov (Protopopov, Sokolyansky in Kharkov, Mokulsky in Kiev, Shevyrev in Odessa, Cheranovsky in Vladikavkaz). From 1925–26, reflexology shared its dominance with reactology and the so-called "Marxist" psychology of Kornilov, who played a leading role in Soviet psychology from that moment until 1930. The significance of K. N. Kornilov in the history of Soviet psychology lies in the fact that he was one of the first to express the idea of the special paths of Soviet psychology as a Marxist psychology and attempted to secure this organizationally, in contrast to other authors (Blonsky, Struminsky). To a significant degree, Soviet psychology owes to him the decisive struggle against Chelpanov, the reorganization of the Psychological Institute, and the concentration of the young forces of Soviet psychology (Vygotsky, Luria, Artemov, Dobrynin, Sapir, etc.). The positions of Kornilov's group, which understood Marxist psychology as a "synthesis" of objective (reflexology) and subjective (empirical psychology) trends, were essentially mechanistic, as a result of which the critique of reflexologism from these positions proved barren. The tasks of Marxist psychology were distorted by an incorrect solution of the psychophysical problem, a vulgar understanding of the social essence of human psychology, and a mechanistic conception of development. Such psychology did not correspond to the tasks of Soviet psychology, which was being reconstructed on Marxist-Leninist foundations, as revealed by the psychological discussion of 1930–31. There were also individual authors who attempted to build Soviet psychology solely with the aid of Western trends (Blonsky, Borovsky, Vygotsky, Luria, Artemov, Spielrein), which objectively served the propaganda of bourgeois psychology. The uncritical assimilation of bourgeois psychology helped class-hostile influences to penetrate Soviet psychology. A number of authors (Frankfurt, Fingert, Sapir, Kurazov, and others) constructed a "methodology" of psychology by formalistically applying categories of dialectics to psychology, divorced from the concrete content of science and socialist practice. The Menshevizing-idealist character of these works should not, however, blind us to their historical significance in the struggle against mechanism in psychology, yet none of them provided any real approximation to the structure of a truly Marxist psychology. As a result of this situation, the 1st Congress on Human Behavior, held in 1930, revealed a huge lag of psychology behind socialist practice and significant distortions of Marxist-Leninist theory. The years 1930–31 mark a period of open struggle against reactology and reflexology on the one hand, and Menshevizing idealism on the other; at present, psychology is being developed by a number of institutions and laboratories. Of particular attention are the works of Vygotsky (Moscow), who is developing the so-called historical conception of the development of higher psychological functions, which is still highly controversial and inadequate (due to a formal-abstract understanding of the history of psychological processes and an eclectic solution of the problems of psychology). Research institutions. Before the revolution, Moscow institutions had empirical-psychological traditions (Grot, Chelpanov) and were connected with the History and Philology Faculty of Moscow University (under whose auspices the Psychological Institute arose). In Petersburg, psychological traditions were neurophysiological and psychoneurological, connected with the Military Medical Academy and medical institutes. Here, Bekhterev created the Psychoneurological Institute (1907), which after the revolution was transformed into a number of institutes headed by the Bekhterev Brain Institute (1918). Chelpanov's Psychological Institute was transformed in 1924 into the Institute of Experimental Psychology, and then (1930) into the Institute of Psychology, Pedology, and Psychotechnics.

In addition, individual psychological studies are conducted at the Institute of Industrial Personnel, the Experimental-Defectological Institute (Vygotsky), and the Institute of Higher Nervous Activity. In Leningrad, the main institution for psychology is the Bekhterev Brain Institute, which includes, besides laboratories for the physiology and morphology of the nervous system, laboratories for psychotechnics and labor physiology, psychology and pedology, pathopsychology, neuropathology with defectology, and comparative psychology and physiology. In Kharkov, the main institution is the Psychological Sector of the Ukrainian Psychoneurological Academy. In the BSSR (Minsk), problems of pathological psychology on neurological and psychiatric material are developed at the Institute of Psychoneurology under the Belarusian Academy of Sciences. The largest institutes abroad are located in Berlin, Leipzig, Hamburg, Marburg, New York, Boston, Worcester, etc. Congresses. In Russia, questions of psychology were included in complex congresses. After the revolution, the following took place: I Psychoneurological Congress (1923, Moscow), II Psychoneurological Congress (1924, Leningrad), I All-Union Pedological Congress (1927, Moscow), I All-Union Congress for the Study of Behavior (1930, Leningrad), I All-Union Congress on Psychotechnics and Applied Psychophysiology (1931, Leningrad). International congresses on psychology: Paris-1889, London-1892, Munich-1896, Paris-1900, Rome-1905, Geneva-1909, Oxford-1923, Groningen-1926, New Haven-1929, Copenhagen-1932. Teaching. In the USSR, psychology is taught as an independent course in pedagogical higher educational institutions. In medical higher educational institutions, it is included as an integral part of the courses in the hygiene of upbringing, psychiatry, medical psychology, etc. The main postgraduate contingents in psychology are trained in the aforementioned scientific institutes. The bibliography on psychology is set forth mainly in works on the history of psychology and contemporary trends, as well as in special periodical publications and reference books.

V.

Ananiev. Medical psychology—a branch of psychology developed in connection with the tasks set by medicine and on the basis of medical experience. This concept is largely conventional and refers not to a definite scientific discipline, but merely to a certain direction given to work in the field of psychology by its relation to medical activity. Indeed, it encompasses, on the one hand, the presentation of psychology for the purposes of medical education, and on the other, the scientific development of psychological problems: 1) having current significance for one or another medical discipline, or 2) important for psychology itself, but requiring data from the field of pathology for their solution. In reality, the majority of works in the field of medical psychology are connected with problems of both orders, so that the indicated division has a predominantly formal significance. The first manual on medical psychology was a book by Lotze, published in 1852 and subtitled "Physiology of the Soul." It was largely based on the same thoughts that later found more detailed and precise expression in works relating to so-called "physiological psychology" (Wundt, Ziehen). This trend dealt predominantly with the problems of the laws governing the origin of sensations and the somatic manifestations of psychological processes (changes in facial musculature, respiration, pulse, blood pressure, etc., accompanying emotional experiences and mental strain). Striving for precision, it devoted much attention to methods for the quantitative evaluation of psychological phenomena and introduced the experimental method into psychological research. Kraepelin, utilizing the latter, initiated the psychological study of the action of medicinal and poisonous substances (alcohol, bromine, hypnotics). To him also belong works on the study of such phenomena bordering on pathology as fatigue and sleep. He introduced the psychological experiment, simultaneously with a number of other psychiatrists (Sommer, Ziehen, and in our country Tokarsky, Bekhterev, Bernstein, Rossolimo, and others), into the practice of the psychiatric clinic, using it to solve a whole series of clinical questions on the basis of the data obtained. Among the problems of medical psychology that attracted special attention in the second half of the 19th century are also questions concerning the role of the "unconscious" or "subconscious" in psychological life (hypnotic phenomena, the psychology of hysterical symptoms, etc.). French neuropathologists and psychiatrists (Charcot, Déjerine, Babinski, and others) paid great attention to the symptomatology of psychopathological phenomena observed by them in "psychoneuroses." The works of Janet were devoted to the psychological development of the corresponding problems. Beginning his activity in the field of medical psychology as a student of Charcot, S. Freud initially proceeded from propositions that in many respects resembled the main ideas of Janet. However, the further development of his views revealed their sharp difference from the views of the French researcher. The fundamental change introduced by Freud into the formulation of problems and research methods of medical psychology is determined not so much by his exceptional attention to sexual experiences and the psychoanalysis methodology introduced by him (see), as by a completely new formulation of the question of the role of affectivity in psychological life and, in particular, in the origin of psychopathological phenomena. Since medical psychology does not represent a discipline with a strictly defined range of problems subject to its resolution, it is natural that all manuals bearing this name, including those published recently (Kretschmer, Schilder), differ sharply from one another not only in content, but also in scope and distribution of the material presented. The absence of an established system of medical psychology led to an attempt at a dictionary processing of its problems (Birnbaum's dictionary), which made it possible to note even such questions as did not fit into the framework of a systematic presentation. The most pressing problems of modern medical psychology (the origin of pathological reactions to affective experiences, the influence on the psyche of various deviations from the norm in the structure and functions of the organism, the role of the social environment in the emergence of abnormal psychological phenomena, the formation and development of pathological characters) are in the closest connection with the problem of personality (see). The false formulation of this problem by bourgeois scientists, caused by their class position, inevitably leads to a number of major errors in the resolution of particular questions of medical psychology by Western European science, which is especially reflected in the extreme one-sidedness of the constructions of individual authors, e.g., Adler (see Adler's doctrine). Bleuler, who did the most to elucidate the role of affectivity in the formation of various psychopathological symptoms and initially declared the materialistic basis of his views, ended with a metaphysical doctrine about the rudimentary form of the psychical—the psychoid—inherent even in inanimate matter. Jung, the author of the doctrine of psychological complexes (see) and complex reactions, who created a very valuable method for studying the affective conditioning of associations, shortly after breaking with Wundt—his teacher—put forward an ultra-idealist and metaphysical doctrine of the "collective unconscious," manifesting itself in the psychological life of individual personalities. Freud himself, although he remained an atheist, came forward with a reactionary metaphysical theory that the main biological drive is the death drive, and a significant part of his orthodox disciples have already openly crossed over to the paths of idealistic and religious metaphysics. Despite all the organic defects from which modern Western European medical psychology suffers by virtue of its class conditioning, it still preserves a large stock of accumulated experience, which does not allow one to treat all its constructions and conclusions with disdain. And its contemporary workers, despite their largely false ideological premises, have very valuable works on individual questions that cannot be ignored. In the post-war period, the most was done in the sense of bringing medical psychology closer to the needs of real life by Kretschmer. His "Medical Psychology," summarizing the result of all his other works, differs sharply both in structure and in content from previous attempts to provide a manual meeting the needs of medical practice. Kretschmer completely abandoned the division of his book into parts corresponding to separate groups of psychological phenomena, and the isolated study of the latter, and arranged the material in such a way that each chapter considers one or another real function from the point of view of structure and in their holistic manifestation. Being under the strong influence of Freud's ideas, Kretschmer, in contrast to the intellectualism of pre-war authors, placed the decisive role of affectivity and the drives of the personality for its development and psychological manifestations at the cornerstone of his psychology. In addition, he attempted, on the one hand, to link the functioning of biologically conditioned psychological apparatuses with their phylogenetic development (see Hypobulic mechanisms, hypobulics, and Hyponoic mechanisms), and on the other hand, on the basis of his doctrine of temperaments, to reveal the main forms of personality reactions to various experiences and to influences emanating from the environment. He divides psychological reactions into primitive and those conditioned by personality structure. Among the latter, an important place is occupied by reactions conditioned by the presence of innate antagonistic tendencies in the personality. The struggle of these tendencies, according to Kretschmer, leads to various pathological types of psychological development, of which he singles out "expansive" and "sensitive" as the most important (see Psychic disharmony). The main vice of all of Kretschmer's psychology is his desire to explain purely biologically such psychological manifestations that are in reality conditioned by social factors, as well as the reactionary fatalism inherent in its very basis, stemming from the idea of the preformation of character. In addition, the sharply expressed class standpoint of the bourgeois scientist is clearly evident in the explanations of individual forms of psychological reactions (e.g., in the role he attributes to the feeling of spiteful envy towards the strong and rich for the development of certain pathological character traits). By virtue of its strongly expressed class character, none of the trends of medical psychology dominant in bourgeois science can be absorbed by Soviet psychology without thorough revision. Medical psychology must proceed from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the class conditioning of the psychological world and specific experiences of every human personality. Pavlov's doctrine of conditioned reflexes must play a very important role in the system of this psychology, although many modern representatives of this doctrine, applying it excessively simplistically, have committed a number of gross errors that led to an inadmissible ignoring of the social side of psychological phenomena. As for the range of problems of medical psychology, apart from the doctrine of the structure and pathological reactions of the personality, including "neurotic phenomena," the central place in it must be occupied by the insufficiently developed problem of the psyche of somatic patients and the possibility of psychological influence on certain pathological processes.

Undoubtedly, positive affects, acting through the autonomic nervous system on blood circulation, can also exert a favorable influence on the very course of diseases, whereas, for example, fear, anguish, and other depressing emotions were blamed by many older physicians for the occurrence of complications. The problem of the psychological reaction to disease in itself is currently arousing greater and greater interest. In contemporary literature, there is already a whole series of works dedicated specifically to the psychology of tuberculous patients (E. Stern), cardiac patients (Fahrenkampf and others), and so forth. Standing apart is the question of the psychology of the maimed, the disabled, and generally persons with somatic defects. Of tremendous practical importance is the study of psychological questions related to the assessment of work capacity, occupational aptitude, and so forth. Enormous attention is attracted by the questions of sexual pathology, which require careful development in view of their important significance for psychotherapy. An important branch of medical psychology comprises the phenomena of psychological instability arising during transitional ages (puberty, presenile, and others - see Age crises). Psychological study is also destined to play a not inconsiderable role in the field of so-called organic neuropathology (diseases of the cerebral hemispheres, syndromes of impaired higher nervous functions). P. Zinovyev.