Matter

MATTER. The term M. is used to denote two concepts: M. as a philosophical category and M. as a category of physics and natural sciences. M. as a philosophical category. "Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality, which is given to man in his sensations, which is copied, photographed, displayed by our sensations, existing independently of them" (Lenin). With the recognition of M. as an objective reality existing outside our consciousness and independently of it, philosophical materialism is inseparably linked. The fundamental question of philosophy is the question of the relation of thinking to being. Philosophers who assert the existence of spirit before nature represent the idealistic direction. For all philosophers of the materialistic direction, matter, nature, is primary. The forms of existence of M. are space and time. "The basic forms of all being are space and time, and being out of time is just as great an absurdity as being out of space" (Engels). Along with time, every materialism recognizes the extension of M. as its basic and inalienable property. Every process of nature is a material process, and in it, therefore, change in time is always connected with M. located in a specific place in space. On the other hand, every material body located in a specific place in space exists in time. This is the fundamental difference between all materialism and various varieties of idealism. Vitalists, for example, admit the existence of non-material factors which exist outside of time and have no extension. "The ultimate basis of that diversity in space or in time which we observe in the development of organisms and in their actions must be recognized as a factor, in itself devoid of extensive diversity, i.e., localization in space or in time. For this factor, only intensive diversity can be recognized. Entelechy, not being a diversity in space and in time, creates such, just as an act of artistic creation, in itself not spatial, results in the creation of a spatial character" (Driesch). In contrast to such views, materialism recognizes the materiality of all processes of nature. Non-material processes, "intensive" by the terminology of vitalists, do not exist. The process of artistic creation, of which Driesch speaks, just like the process of thinking, represents a special form of motion of organic M. It also takes place in space and in time, inseparably connected with M. "Apart from substance possessing extension, there is no thinking substance." This formulation by Huxley is called by Plekhanov "an extremely successful expression of the materialistic view of the processes of consciousness." Thus, matter exists in space and in time, and time and space as forms of existence of M. are also objective reality. One of the fundamental problems is the relationship between M. and motion. Dialectical materialism asserts the inseparability of motion from M. There is no motion without M., just as there is no M. without motion. "To tear motion from matter is equivalent to tearing thinking from objective reality, tearing my sensations from the external world, i.e., to go over to the side of idealism" (Lenin). Motion is a form of existence of M. The world is moving M. Space and time as forms of existence of M. are inseparably connected with each other in moving M. "Motion, considered in the most general sense, i.e., understood as the mode of existence of matter, as an attribute internally inherent in M., encompasses all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from simple displacement to thinking" (Engels). All processes of nature are the transition of one form of motion of M. into another. These transitions of one form of motion into another occur not as a result of external forces compelling inert M. to change its form of motion, but by virtue of internal contradictions inherent in each form of motion. In this is the fundamental difference between dialectical materialism and metaphysical materialism, which views the motion of M. and the transition of one form of motion into another not as inherent by nature to moving M., but as introduced into matter by extraneous forces from the outside. The concept of self-motion is one of the most fundamental concepts of dialectical materialism. M. as an objective reality confronts us as something given, as something uncreatable and indestructible. From this it follows that motion as a form of existence of M. is also uncreatable and indestructible. Like M., motion cannot disappear. One form of motion of M. can pass into another form of motion. Thus, dialectical materialism asserts the universal connection of all forms of motion. "The subject of natural science is moving matter, bodies. Bodies cannot be separated from motion. The forms and types of bodies can be known only in motion. Only in motion does a body reveal what it represents. Natural science thus knows bodies by considering them in their relation to each other in motion. The knowledge of various forms of motion is the knowledge of bodies. Thus, the study of these various forms of motion is the main subject of natural science" (Engels). M. as a category of physics. The most ancient ideas about the structure of M. are atomistic theories. Democritus believed that M. consists of indivisible atoms which move in a void. In modern times, the atomistic theory was revived by Gassendi and Boyle. Atomistic theories received special development in physics after the creation of the kinetic theory of M. by Clausius, Boltzmann, and Maxwell. This theory assumes that M. consists of atoms in continuous motion. All properties of M. must be explained from the motion and arrangement of atoms. In this respect, the kinetic theory of M. is closely connected with the mechanistic worldview. The atomistic theory assumes that in its basis, matter is discontinuous, discrete. The one-sided recognition by classical physics of the discreteness of M. cannot explain the entire totality of physical phenomena. Electromagnetic phenomena require for their explanation the presence of a continuous medium—the ether. The ether of classical physics is also a material medium, but unlike ordinary M., it does not have an atomistic structure, i.e., it does not consist of discrete particles. Thus, classical physics accepted the existence of an absolutely continuous ether alongside discrete atoms. The main problem was the problem of the relationship between atoms and the ether, i.e., between the discontinuous and continuous structure of M. Classical physics sought to reduce discontinuity to continuity, i.e., to interpret discrete particles as condensations or a special kind of motion of a material continuous medium—the ether. The most important of such attempts in the history of physics is the theory of the vortex atom of William Thomson. Thomson assumed that in its basis, M. is absolutely continuous and represents, as it were, an ideal fluid. In this prime matter, there exist circular vortex motions. Helmholtz showed that if a vortex ring was ever created in an ideal fluid, it exists eternally and cannot be destroyed or divided into parts. Using this theory of Helmholtz, Thomson assumed that an atom is nothing other than a vortex ring in the ether. Thus, the indivisible, discrete atom is derived from the motion of a continuous medium. Many other attempts were made to derive the discrete atom from continuity, but all of them, like Thomson's attempt, ended in failure. There were also attempts to attribute an atomistic structure to the ether, i.e., to take the point of view of pure discreteness of M., but such attempts did not lead to any serious results. The unsatisfactoriness of the model of the vortex atom of W. Thomson consists in the fact that it provides an explanation only for the most general properties of the atom—its indestructibility, stability, and discrete nature. However, it turned out to be impossible, based on this model, to explain the properties of real bodies (elasticity, electrical properties, etc.). And this is precisely the necessary condition that is imposed on a physical model of the atom. The fundamental unsatisfactoriness of such theories, which seek to reduce the problem of the structure of M. only to pure continuity or to pure discreteness, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, consists in the fact that in the question of the structure of M., they become one-sidedly on the point of view of the primacy of either discontinuity or continuity. Discontinuity and continuity represent a dialectical contradiction; therefore, the solution to the question lies not in the one-sided reduction of discontinuity to continuity or vice versa, but in their synthesis, which, among other things, is confirmed by the quantum theory of the structure of matter. In classical physics, the atomism of M. was accepted alongside the continuity of the ether. Between these two types of M., there was no internal connection. As stated above, attempts to establish this connection by reducing atoms to formations in a continuous ether or vice versa failed. In modern physics, a fundamentally different solution to the question has recently begun to take shape, placing the idea of the synthesis of discontinuity and continuity at the foundation.

The fundamental problem of modern physics is the relationship between the corpuscle (electron) and the wave process in a continuous medium (ether), since wave motion is one of the basic types of motion of a continuous medium. When modern physics began to study intra-atomic processes, one of the most important discoveries was quanta (see Quantum theory). In its application to the theory of the structure of matter, the quantum theory established discontinuity in intra-atomic processes. According to the views of the quantum theory of the structure of matter, an atom consists of a nucleus charged with positive electricity, around which negatively charged electrons revolve. The quantum (discontinuous) nature of the motion of electrons lies in the fact that they cannot move around the nucleus in just any orbits, but only in specific orbits that constitute a discrete series. The transition of an electron from one orbit to another occurs by a jump. Since optical phenomena, phenomena of radiation of both visible light and various other rays (X-rays, etc.), are connected with the jumping of electrons from one orbit to another, the quantum theory of the atom introduces discontinuity into optical phenomena, which were considered by classical physics as the prototype of continuity. Thus, the quantum theory reveals a discontinuous structure in those phenomena which served as the prototype of continuity for classical physics. Recently, in connection with the further development of quantum theory, discoveries have been made that reveal features of continuity in those phenomena which were previously considered purely discrete. Davisson and Germer showed that a beam of electrons, when reflected from crystals, behaves as if it also represents a process in a continuous medium. In a beam of electrons, which represents the motion of a collection of discrete particles, diffraction phenomena have been discovered, which classical physics considered characteristic only of wave processes in a continuous medium. These discoveries pose the question of the structure of matter in a new way. If classical physics saw the only path to solving the problem of the structure of matter in the one-sided recognition of the continuity of matter and strove to derive discreteness from continuity, then modern physicists are beginning to pose the question of the synthesis of discontinuity and continuity. Real matter is both discontinuous and continuous. A discrete electron is inseparable from the wave-like continuous process inherent to it, and in every continuous wave process (e.g., the propagation of light) its discontinuous structure (quanta of light) can be revealed. In the problem of matter, by recognizing the contradictory nature of the structure of real matter, modern physics is approaching the standpoint of dialectical materialism. It should be noted, however, that far from all physicists stand on the viewpoint of the reality of the contradictory structure of matter and the irreducibility of discreteness to continuity. In modern physics, there are still continuing attempts to derive discontinuity from continuity (the school of J. J. Thomson); on the other hand, a number of prominent physicists are inclined not to attribute an objective character to the contradiction of discontinuity and continuity, but to recognize this contradiction as existing only in our consciousness. This trend (Jordan, Heisenberg) often goes as far as the idealistic denial of the reality of atoms (Heisenberg). In the very recent past (1933–34), our views on the structure of matter have undergone further change. Along with the electron and the proton, which were considered the "ultimate" bricks of matter, new elementary particles were discovered during the study of the atomic nucleus: positrons and neutrons (see Atomic nucleus). These same discoveries significantly change our ideas about the structure of the atom and confirm once again that in nature there are no ultimate, indivisible, absolutely elementary particles of matter (see Atomic nucleus, Quantum theory). The relationship between the philosophical and physical concepts of matter. The philosophical definition of matter given above is the most general. The peculiarity of the definition of matter given by Lenin consists in the fact that "it is impossible to give any other definition of the two ultimate concepts of epistemology (matter and spirit) except by indicating which of them is taken as primary." The concepts of matter and spirit are the most broadly defined concepts. It is precisely for this reason that one cannot confuse those definitions of matter given by physics at each stage of its development with the philosophical definition of matter, which retains all its significance despite the change in our views on the concrete physical structure of matter. Lenin points out that in physics, the question of this or that structure of matter is often confused with matter as a philosophical category. Such confusion leads to physical idealism. The end of the 19th century was marked by a whole series of discoveries that fundamentally changed our views on the structure of matter. X-rays opened up a special field of phenomena in the ether. A new property of X-rays was that they could freely pass through obstacles impenetrable to ordinary types of radiation (visible light, heat rays), for example, through a wooden board several centimeters thick and even through some metals. The phenomena of radioactivity produced a revolution in views on the atom. The new chemical element discovered in 1898—radium—showed the ability to spontaneously decay and emit the chemical element helium. The indivisible and unchangeable atom of classical physics and chemistry turned out to be, in fact, divisible and changeable. Moreover, the possibility of the transition, the transformation of one chemical element into another, was proven by the phenomena of radioactive decay of atoms. Chemical elements, in which classical physics saw isolated, undecomposable substances, turned out to be internally connected with each other, turned out to be formations of a single process of development. Finally, the electron theory, which considers electric current as the motion of the smallest particles of electricity—electrons—established that, by decaying, the atom emits electrons from itself and, consequently, has a complex structure. The elementary particle of matter of classical physics, the atom, turned out to be built from particles of electricity. An electrical theory of matter arose. The basic property of the atom was its inert mass, which was measured by its weight. In the phenomena of radioactive decay, it became possible to observe electrons moving at speeds completely unknown to classical physics. If the greatest speeds for classical physics were the speeds of motion of celestial bodies, not exceeding 30–50 km per second, then for the motion of electrons ejected during radioactive decay, monstrous speeds were found—over 250,000 km per second. By studying the motion of electrons at these speeds experimentally, physicists established that the magnitude of the mass of an electron, in contrast to the views of classical physics, can change depending on the speed of motion. If this fact was unknown to classical physics, it was because in all phenomena studied before radioactive decay, physics dealt with very small speeds of motion of bodies. One of the basic principles of classical mechanics and physics—the principle of the invariance of mass—turned out to be undermined. Classical physics considered the basic property of mass to be the property inherent in every substance to preserve acquired motion and to offer resistance to a change in the state of motion in which the body is located. If we want to set a body at rest into motion, we must expend a certain effort, a certain amount of energy. The greater this effort, the greater the mass of the body. In order to impart the same speed to a bicycle and a locomotive, different efforts and different amounts of energy are required; therefore, we conclude that the mass of the locomotive is greater than the mass of the bicycle. This property of all bodies to offer resistance to a change in motion is called by physicists inert mass (sluggish, immobile). Classical physics recognized this property of possessing inert mass only for matter. Energy, as has already been mentioned, could be imparted to a given material body, but its mass did not change from this. In other words, energy (according to the views of classical physics) did not possess mass. The same experiments on rapidly moving electrons showed that it is impossible to draw an impassable boundary between mass and energy. Energy also possesses mass. Mass and energy are different types of motion of matter. There cannot be energy without mass, just as there cannot exist mass without energy. A moving electron possesses a store of electromagnetic energy. Since, according to the views of the new physics, energy possesses mass, a moving electron possesses not only inert mass, like the mass of an uncharged atom, but also electromagnetic mass. It even turns out (and at very high speeds of electron motion this can be established by experiment) that their inert mass is equal to zero and the entire mass of the electron consists of electromagnetic mass. Inert mass was considered by classical physics to be one of the main signs of the materiality of bodies. Since the inert mass of the electron turned out to be equal to zero, it seemed to the representatives of the old physics that matter was disappearing. Thus, all those concepts which the old physics considered basic and immutable were fundamentally destroyed.

The indivisible atom became divisible and subject to development, mass ceased to be immutable and became intertwined with energy; the fundamental particles of Matter turned out to be not indivisible inert atoms possessing only the property of mechanical motion, but electrical particles, electrons, which cause complex electromagnetic phenomena during their motion. Such a breakdown could not but affect the mechanical worldview. Despite the brilliant successes of the mechanical worldview at the beginning of the 19th century, a whole series of facts had accumulated in atomic physics by the end of the 1880s which could not be explained based on the mechanical worldview. In particular, electromagnetic phenomena did not lend themselves to mechanical interpretation, i.e., it was not possible to derive electrical and magnetic phenomena from the motions of non-electrified and non-magnetized atoms. As long as electrical and magnetic phenomena remained one of the specific fields of physics, the impossibility of explaining them mechanically represented a major shortcoming of the mechanical worldview, but most physicists still had the hope of including this field of physics within the framework of mechanical explanation. The situation changed significantly when, with the decomposition of the atom into electrons, it became clear that electromagnetic phenomena constitute the basis of all phenomena. The very field of phenomena in which the mechanical worldview refused to serve turned out to lie at the basis of all phenomena. Not only was it necessary to make fundamental changes to the very concepts of mass and energy, which lie at the basis of mechanical physics, but it was also necessary to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between mechanical displacement and other forms of motion of Matter. Mechanical motion, which was previously considered the basis and universal form of motion from which all other types of motion were to be explained, itself turned out to be only a specific form of motion, at the basis of which lies electromagnetic motion, just as the atom consists at its base of electrons. The impossibility of a mechanical theory of electromagnetic phenomena or new discoveries that do not fit into the framework of mechanical materialism cause disappointment in the mechanical worldview. Instead of the dominant mechanical direction, two main currents arise. A large group of old physicists (Lorentz, Thomson) continues to remain in the position of the mechanical worldview and harbors hopes of eventually fitting all new phenomena into the framework of mechanical physics. Another group of physicists believes that the mechanical worldview has collapsed. And since materialism in the physics of this era appeared as mechanical materialism, the conclusion is drawn that materialism has collapsed. Thus, because views on the structure of Matter changed fundamentally, and because a whole series of properties (inert mass) which classical physics considered an inalienable property of Matter lost their absolute character, physicists began to say that "matter has disappeared," that materialism has been refuted by the latest development of physics. In reality, it is not Matter that disappears, but the limit to which we knew Matter that disappears. "Such properties of Matter disappear which previously seemed absolute and immutable, primary (impenetrability, inertia, mass) and which have been revealed as relative, inherent only to certain states of Matter" (Lenin). Whatever the change in views on the concrete physical structure of Matter may be, it cannot affect the philosophical definition of Matter and "refute" materialism, since "the only property of Matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our consciousness" (Lenin).