Reflexology

REFLEXOLOGY, the doctrine of reflexes, or reflective phenomena in organisms (see Reflexes). 1. Essence of terminology. A number of functions in the plant, animal, and human organism that occur rapidly and in response to external stimulation were called reflexive or reflective. The concept of the organism's reflective activity was introduced by analogy with optical reflectors. Acts such as the sudden and involuntary closing of the eyelids when a foreign body enters the eye, the appearance of grimaces when the facial skin is tickled during sleep, salivation when acidic stimulation is applied, etc., were interpreted as reflective (reflexive). Such reflective activity can also be observed in certain plants, for example, in the Venus flytrap. From the analysis of the nervous mechanisms that implement reflexive activity (see Reflexes), it is evident that reflective activity is not only a consequence of external irritations, but also of irritations flowing to the nerve centers from within (endogenous and proprioceptive irritations). 2. History of the question. The first of the natural scientists to introduce the terminology and the concept itself of the reflexive activity of the animal and human organism was Descartes (17th century). In connection with his philosophical views and the doctrine of innate ideas, Descartes sharply distinguished animals from humans, with the sign of such opposition being the presence (in Descartes' opinion) of a soul and innate ideas in humans and their absence in animals. Descartes likened the latter to simple machines operating according to the basic laws of reflective activity. K. Marx, in one of the notes to Volume 1 of 'Capital', remarked that 'Descartes, by defining animals as simple machines, looks with the eyes of the manufacturing period, in contrast to the Middle Ages, which saw in the animal 'the helper of man'. However, Descartes did not limit himself to explaining the reflexive activity of animals, but also attempted to explain some of the automatic functions of humans as reflex-forming and independent of the activity of the human soul. Descartes understood the human body itself as follows: 'I assume that the body is nothing other than a statue or machine made of earthly material.' Consequently, the human body is a simple machine, but in it is embedded a soul that knows warmth and movement. 'The body of a living person differs from the body of a dead person as much as a clock or any other automatic machine, i.e., any self-moving machine, differs when it is wound up and has in it the bodily principle of motion to which it is destined and everything necessary for its action—from a clock or another machine when it is broken and its motor has ceased to exist.' The winding of the human machine depends on the soul, on the spirit. In addition, man, just like an animal, works reflex-formingly according to the laws of a machine. Descartes most clearly expressed himself about the reflex-forming activity of the organism in connection with the characterization of movement and extension: 'When a blind man touches an object, it is obvious that this object sends nothing from itself, but only moves the stick in the same way, then the nerves of the hand and finally those places in the brain from which these nerves come. And this gives his soul occasion to perceive so many different qualities in bodies as there are different movements excited by these bodies in his brain.' Descartes was the first to establish the concept of a motor act and its construction by centripetal and centrifugal nerves. The formation of memory, according to Descartes, in humans also proceeds mainly according to the reflex-forming type, namely: 'Our external senses passively receive the actions of external objects, as wax receives the imprint of a seal. The external form of the sensing body is indeed changed by the object, as wax by a seal. After the external sense is set in motion by the object, the figure produced by it is transferred to another part of the body called the common sensory center; these figures are usually preserved for a long time and this is what is called memory.' From all the foregoing, it follows that Descartes was the first to raise the question and provide some justification for the reflexive activity not only of animals but also of humans. We are therefore in full agreement with Academician I. P. Pavlov and can assert with his words that 'Descartes 300 years ago established the concept of the reflex as the basic act of the nervous system.' The next stage in the history of the development of reflexology is the doctrine of the 18th-century French materialist La Mettrie. La Mettrie began by disputing Descartes' division of animals and humans and, as a third attribute of matter, recognized the ability to feel or sense, therefore, in his opinion, even animal-machines are not devoid of sensitivity. On the other hand, La Mettrie banishes every representation of souls as something super-material. La Mettrie asserts that the soul is not an independent substance or being, separate from the body and having its seat, as Descartes claimed, in the pineal gland. Everything that is attributed to the soul can be explained by what anatomy and physiology reveal to us in brain tissue. Sensations are the basic elements of the soul, without sensations there is no soul. The true seat of the soul is the entire brain, and the soul is nothing other than the brain itself, because here all the nerves are concentrated, through which a subtle substance flows and brings all new and new imprints, giving all new and new representations and causing the alternation of various processes in the brain. La Mettrie also objects to the localization of the soul in the pineal gland. Thought, according to La Mettrie, is a certain modification of the sensitive principle. In his works 'Man a Machine', 'Man a Plant' and in the treatise 'On the Soul', La Mettrie most fully developed the propositions about the reflex-forming activity of man, as well as of the animal. La Mettrie, starting from the concept of the reflex-forming action of the organism, established a close connection between movement and feeling. 'The soul is only the moving principle or the sensitive material part of the brain, which can be considered the main element of our entire mechanism.' La Mettrie, however, is not always in agreement with some anatomists who establish a direct connection between the volume of the brain and intellect, and declares that 'it is still necessary that quality corresponds to quantity and that the solid and liquid parts are in a certain equilibrium, which is a necessary condition for health.' La Mettrie represents to himself the mechanism of the action of sensitivity and movement as follows: 'These organs (we are talking about sense organs) act through the nerves and some substance flowing inside them and differing in such subtlety that it was called animal spirit; its existence is established by such a multitude of experiments and solid arguments that I will not waste time here proving it. When the sense organs are acted upon by some object, the nerves that make up these organs come into vibration, and the altered movement of the animal spirits is transmitted to the brain, up to the common sensory center, i.e., to that very place where the sensitive soul perceives sensations by means of the flow of these spirits acting upon it by their movement. A multitude of experiments has shown us that the soul perceives the sensations proper to animals precisely in the brain, since when this part of the body is significantly damaged, the animal loses sensitivity, the ability to recognize and knowledge. All parts of the body located above wounds and bandages retain their connection with each other and with the brain; sensitivity is lost below, between the bandage and the extremities.'-Identifying psychic activity with reflexive sensibility and the function of sense organs, La Mettrie came out against those scientists (Perron-Stuart, Tabor) who believed that the soul experiences sensations in all parts of the body, because there are nerves in all parts of the body, and thereby emphasized the predominant role of the brain as the organ of thought. The essence of the laws of sensation, according to La Mettrie, consists in the quantitative proportionality between the action of external objects on the sense organs and the acuity of perception and the strength of the response to this perception. The stronger the action, the stronger the representation and the response to it, and the entire activity of the brain and the body as a whole proceeds according to the type of reflex action. In other 18th-century French materialists, we also encounter reflexological positions expressed by them in connection with their general philosophical concepts and especially where they speak of the soul and the ability to feel. In his 'System of Nature', Holbach, analyzing the question of the soul and the system of spiritualism and especially the question of mental abilities as the natural ability to feel, speaks of the reflex-forming activity of the nervous system and the brain. We meet with similar statements in Diderot in his letters about the blind, in the 'Conversations' of d'Alembert, etc. Helvétius, a consistent follower of the sensationalist Locke, analyzing the activity of sense organs and their role in perceiving the external world, proceeds from the same reflex-forming mechanism of their activity, which was already recognized by La Mettrie.

In the later representative of 18th-century materialists, the philosopher and physician Cabanis, we also encounter reflexological positions, particularly in a work directed at investigating external and internal impressions in both normal and pathological states of the organism. The next stage in the development of R. consists of individual theoretical statements and a number of purely physiological works by the vulgar materialists of the first half of the 19th century (Karl Vogt, Moleschott, Büchner), who continued Lametrie's teaching on the reflex activity of the organism. Moleschot conceives of the activity of the nervous system as the result of the flow of specific energy through nervous tissue from the periphery to the center and back, as a result of which the machine-like activity of the organism occurs. In relation to the new level of data from physics, new terminology and new definitions already exist in understanding the mechanics of the nervous system's action. Karl Vogt, in his physiological letters, formulates the question of reflex activity as follows: 'Excitation, communicated in some way to the peripheral ending of a nerve fiber, with centripetal conductivity is transmitted to the brain and is perceived there by consciousness as the limitation of a certain local sensation' (Karl Vogt, Physiological Letters, Volume II, p. 303). And then, from the brain, it returns and is realized in the form of movement on the periphery. Here the question of reflex activity is directly raised, in expressions that were almost completely repeated by Sechenov and provided the basis for the experimental verification of the reflex activity of the spinal cord. In Vogt we also encounter an expression that became commonplace, that the brain secretes thought just as the liver secretes bile; with this Vogt expressed in a brief formula his conception of the mechanics of brain activity, and in particular this gave Engels the reason to call Vogt and the vulgar materialists who supported him 'cheap purveyors of materialism.' Moleschot, about two years after these statements, in connection with a dispute that arose around the position put forward by Vogt in 1862, in one work, speaking of the mechanics of the brain, also states that 'the brain is just as necessary for the formation of thought as the liver is for the preparation of bile and the kidneys for the secretion of urine.' After the vulgar materialists, the next stage in the development of R. is Griesinger, who in the course of his reaction against the purely idealistic school of psychiatry in Germany in the 30s-40s of the 19th century, and in connection with the socio-economic shifts occurring in Germany in the 40s, in his views on psychopathology adopted the standpoint of previous reflexologists and himself further developed the concept of the reflex-forming activity of the nervous system. In this, Griesinger most boldly and most soundly (since he was engaged precisely in questions of psychiatry) raised the question of psychic functions proceeding according to the type of reflex-forming activity. Griesinger says: 'The psychic life of man, as well as of animals, begins in the sense organs and manifests itself in movements. The transition from sensory excitation to motor activity occurs according to the general plan of reflex action, accompanied by consciousness. Simple forms of such an influx and efflux in various degrees of development can be observed in animals and in the child.' The next stage in the development of R. are the works and statements of I. M. Sechenov. Griesinger, as a predecessor of Sechenov, most fully raised the question after the vulgar materialists about the reflexes of the brain in relation to higher psychic functions. Soon after him, these questions were most fully raised by Sechenov, who could not have been unaware of the statements of Griesinger, as well as of Vogt and Moleschott. In particular, the works of Moleschot, such as: 'The Doctrine of Food,' 'Physiological Sketches,' 'The Circuit of Life,' 'The Essence of Man,' and a number of other separate physiological essays dating from the 40s-50s of the 19th century, were widely propagated in Russia by Pisarev in 'Russian Word.' Sechenov was under a double influence: in particular, like many of his contemporaries, he was under the influence of Pisarev's physiological letters. Sechenov, in his notes, indicates that in all the circles and salons of that time conversations revolved around the positions of the mechanists, that there were two parties—one defending idealistic conceptions, speaking of the soul, of some higher being, and the other—the extreme camp which stood on the viewpoint of vulgar materialists—Karl Vogt and Moleschott. Sechenov himself went through a path of development from defending idealistic positions in disputes to defending and substantiating materialism. The latter was closely connected with Sechenov's work under Helmholtz, Claude Bernard, and their teacher Johannes Müller, and was also determined by the corresponding circumstances of that time. By the time of Sechenov's reflexological works, the development of capitalism in Russia with the formation of a new bourgeois class was occurring, and this new class naturally posed the question of the relationship to man and nature in a new way. But unlike the bourgeoisie of France and even Germany, the Russian bourgeoisie was at that time less revolutionary than even the German bourgeoisie of 1848. In connection with a whole series of peculiarities in the development of capitalism in Russia, the Russian bourgeoisie was in a state of greater division, greater dualism, than their class comrades in other countries, and naturally Sechenov in his worldview reflected the dualism of his class. However, basically Sechenov belonged to materialism. (For more details on his general philosophical views—see Sechenov.) The entire essence of R. was developed by Sechenov in his book 'Reflexes of the Brain,' which was in time one of his first works and is rightly considered a book that made an epoch. A number of positions put forward by I. M. Sechenov in this book were then brilliantly confirmed on experimental material; it is sufficient to point to the study of spinal reflexes in decapitated frogs. In 'Reflexes of the Brain' the question of reducing all the infinitely diverse external manifestations of man to muscular movement is most clearly posed. 'All the infinite diversity of external manifestations of brain activity is finally reduced to only one phenomenon—to muscular movement. Whether a child laughs at the sight of a toy... whether Newton creates the world laws and writes them on paper—in all cases the final fact is muscular movement.' 'Therefore, the brain is the organ of the soul, under certain conditions it can produce movements in a fateful way, i.e., just like any machine, just as for example in wall clocks the hand moves fateful way because the weights turn the clock wheels.' Sechenov divided all of man's activity into a certain sum of reflexes, dividing them into two or three categories, namely: into the simplest, then complex, consciously sensory, and then reflexes in connection with acts of a central order. However, Sechenov distinguished these gradations mainly by the nature of the manifestation of the reflex as a shortened or lengthened reflex act. In the book 'Reflexes of the Brain' Sechenov explains all complex psychological behavior from the point of view of the shortening and lengthening of the reflex act. Moreover, when speaking of association, of consciousness, he represented association, just like the vulgar materialists, namely as successive series of reflexes in which the end of each previous one is linked to the beginning of the next. Passion, thinking, and other psychological processes he explained by the nature of the reflex, the degree of its shortening and lengthening. With this reflex chain he explained all complex psychic acts. His conclusion is the following: 'All acts of conscious and unconscious life, by the way of their origin, are reflexes.'—The reflexological works of Sechenov and in particular 'Reflexes of the Brain' played basically a positive role in the struggle against idealism. The next stage in the development of reflexology were the works of I. P. Pavlov, V. M. Bekhterev and their schools and followers not only in physiology, but also in other branches of science, including in biology, in medicine and its separate branches—neuropathology, psychiatry and even in social sciences. 3. Pavlovian reflexological direction. I. P. Pavlov is considered the successor of Sechenov and continuer of his reflexological direction, however the doctrine of reflexes developed by I. P. Pavlov was raised by him to a high level of experimental and theoretical substantiation and constituted a new stage in the doctrine of conditioned reflexes. The initial works of I. P. Pavlov on the study of the physiology of digestion and his brilliant experiments with the device of a second stomach (Pavlov's stomach pouch) and observation of the nature of the secretory activity depending on the nature of the food given to the dog were based on the concept of the reflex activity of the stomach.—Studying gastric and salivary secretion in dogs with fistulas, Pavlov noticed that the secretion of the glands' secretions could occur without irritation of any receptive areas of the digestive tract. It was sufficient to show the dog the dish from which it usually receives food, or even to rattle the dish, and saliva begins to be secreted.'

Just as irritation of the oral cavity receptors by food, and also the irritations of other sense organs associated with eating, are projected through the lower parts of the brain into the cortex of the cerebral hemispheres, Pavlov assumed that a connection is established between the excited areas of the hemispheres, through which excitation can subsequently pass from the area irritated, for example, by the clatter of dishes, to that part of the cortex which is connected with the act of eating, in particular with salivation. From here, excitation goes through the lower parts of the brain to the gland. The described reflexes to visual, auditory, etc. irritations received the name of natural conditioned reflexes. All reflexes that do not require for their formation and occurrence special individual conditions (spinal reflexes, reflexes of position), Pavlov proposed to call unconditional. On the basis of these unconditional reflexes, natural conditioned reflexes are formed and artificial conditioned reflexes can be developed. Such a basis for the predominantly studied conditioned reflexes of Pavlov is the unconditional food salivary reflex. Initially, along with the food salivary unconditional reflex, Pavlov used the defensive salivary unconditional reflex to the pouring of acid into the dog's mouth. Almost simultaneously with Pavlov, Bekhterev also began the study of conditioned reflexes, using the unconditional defensive reflex to painful irritation of the skin, which gave a motor response. Bekhterev applied the same principle of combining various irritants with an unconditional reflex, but called the obtained reflexes not conditioned, but associative (see below). The experiments of Pavlov's school primarily clarified the laws of formation of artificial conditioned reflexes. One of the conditions for the formation of a conditioned reflex is the precedence of the beginning of the conditioned irritator over the beginning of the unconditional one. In the case of attaching a conditioned irritator already at the moment of action of the unconditional one, a conditioned reflex, despite repeated coincidence of the new agent with unconditional salivation, as a rule, does not form. Apparently, under these conditions, the action of a strong unconditional irritator creates inhibition in those parts of the cortex onto which our conditioned irritants fall, according to the laws of induction, and the connection between these parts of the cortex with the excited cortical areas associated with salivation is not established. The strength of the attached irritation also has significance in the development of a conditioned reflex. A developed natural or artificial conditioned reflex after repeated coincidence with food can, if the combination of conditioned irritation with unconditional is stopped, extinguish after some time. Extinction (destruction) of the conditioned connection can also be achieved artificially - by repeated conditional irritation of the animal without subsequent feeding (without reinforcement). To extinguish a reflex does not mean to destroy it. After some time, the extinguished reflex can be restored. The reflex was not destroyed, it was only inhibited. Among the numerous other questions of the physiology of the cerebral cortex developed by Pavlov (differentiation-discrimination, inhibition, 'irradiation and concentration of excitation and inhibition processes, induction, synthetic activity, etc.), in terms of significance and development, the question of conditioned reflexes of the second order and conditioned inhibitions stands out. When a conditioned irritator is connected with an unconditional one, for example, light with feeding, a conditioned reflex to light was developed in the dog. When the conditioned reflex reached a certain magnitude, another irritator was added to the light, for example, a tone of a certain frequency of oscillations per second. By this path, Pavlov assumed to obtain a conditioned reflex of the second order, i.e., salivation to one secondarily attached irritator. Under certain conditions, it is thus possible to obtain a reflex of the second, and in some animals even of the third order. A conditioned reflex of the second order, however, is little stable. A similar mechanism underlies differentiation-discrimination. Concentration of the excitation process can, however, also occur spontaneously without artificial limitation of excitation by the inhibitory process. Similarly, irradiation and concentration of the inhibition process proceed. Such is a brief conclusion of the doctrine of conditioned reflexes, as it has developed to the present time (see Conditioned reflexes). Valuable data have been accumulated by Pavlov in the combination of the conditioned reflex technique with extirpations. Important questions of localization in the cerebral cortex found their resolution. The accumulation of analytical material made it possible to proceed to the study of synthetic nervous activity. Physiol. data provided material for the resolution of biol. problems. Pavlov developed the doctrine of the types of the nervous system of dogs in connection with their different reactivity to irritants. Two extreme types are distinguished. In one type, the 'irritable' process predominates over the inhibitory one. This type is analogous to the choleric temperament, and in the other, on the contrary, the inhibitory process predominates over the irritable one (melancholic). Between these two extreme types, there are still two subtypes with balanced excitation and inhibition: one with predominance of excitation (sanguine), and the second - of inhibition (phlegmatic). The giving of difficult tasks, for example, differentiation, can lead to a breakdown of normal activity and to the formation of a special 'neurosis', proceeding differently in different types of organization of the nervous system in dogs. In an excitable dog, inhibitions completely disappear, and in the inhibitory type, on the contrary, the process of excitation in the cortex extremely weakens, and even almost disappears. With some conditionality, this 'typology' can be accepted for practical work on animals. In his first public speech on questions of R. (speech at the congress in Madrid; 1903), I. P. Pavlov raised the question first of all about the complete exclusion of psychological concepts and their replacement by concepts of conditioned-reflex activity. Every conditioned reflex arises due to the existence of an unconditional reflex, is formed even with a single coincidence in time of action with an unconditional irritator and is destroyed with long absence of this coincidence. Further works give I. P. Pavlov the possibility to expand the very concept of the theory of excitation, inhibition, etc., and then to put forward some new positions regarding excitation and inhibition, while at the same time an attempt is made to substantiate some methodological positions of the doctrine. First of all, Pavlov, like Sechenov, proceeds from the theory of equilibrium between the organism and the environment, assuming that all nervous processes proceeding inside, in the order of replacement of one equilibrium by another, are based on it. Pavlov makes an attempt to identify the activity of man and animal on the basis of the assertion about the machine-like character of the activity of both, which emphasizes the possibility of unconditional complete transfer of the obtained material from animals to humans. To the same time belongs the development of the question of the inhibitory process. If earlier I. P. Pavlov, speaking about excitation and inhibition, represented these processes as completely parallel, as if independent of each other, then in the further development of the question, an assumption is made about the possible connection between these two processes - inhibition and excitation. In 1908, he expresses the position on the possibility of disinhibition of inhibition by the application of other inhibitory conditioned reflexes, with confirmation of the experiment by the introduction of another component leading to the disinhibition of the inhibited conditioned reflex. Thus, we see that as experimental material accumulates in Pavlov, his concepts of the nervous activity of animals become more and more complex. In 1909, I. P. Pavlov attempts to give a general definition of the functions of the cortex, formulating it as follows: 'I am inclined to think that the cerebral hemispheres represent, mainly and perhaps exclusively, the cerebral end of the analyzer.' Thus, as early as 1909, an attempt is made on the basis of factual material to give a general representation of the functions of the cerebral cortex as the function of an analyzer. Questions about the synthesizing role of the cortex were formulated only by 1927-28, i.e., it took 20 years of hard work for the question of the synthetic activity of the cortex to be posed, and for 20 years Pavlov stood on the point of view that the cortex is only an analyzer, only a large board on which incoming irritation from outside receives, as it were, its own place. Subsequent works of Pavlov, dating from 1910-11, raise the question of the presence of different stages of inhibition. If until 1910 there was the idea that there is only one type of inhibition and one type of excitation, and these are as if processes completely unrelated to each other, then the subsequent accumulation of material gives Pavlov the possibility to raise the question of the presence of three forms of inhibition. He speaks of inhibitory extinction, of differentiated inhibition, and finally of hypnotic order inhibition. In 1911, a new concept of irradiation and concentration, excitation and inhibition is introduced.

In 1912, we already find Pavlov raising one of the most important questions of R., namely about the unified nature of inhibition and excitation. 'Inhibition follows excitation,' says I. P. Pavlov, 'it is in some way, as it were, the reverse side of irritation.' From 1912, work on the unity of excitation and inhibition began to progress further, so that by approximately 1916 material had accumulated, and in our own time the question of the presence of various phases has been developed over a number of years, the concept of induction is introduced, developed by Sherrington in relation to the spinal cord, and thanks to induction with its phases—equalizing, enhancing, normal—a bridge is already thrown, which makes it possible to assert more definitely the unity of the processes of excitation and inhibition. To this same time belongs the following formulation about the basic function of the nervous system: 'The main activity of the central nervous system is reflexive, reflected, i.e., the transfer, throwing over of irritation from centripetal paths to centrifugal ones.' 'All the complexity of nervous activity, which was previously interpreted as psychic activity, appears to us,' says I. P. Pavlov, 'in the form of the work of two basic mechanisms: the mechanism of the formation of temporary connections between agents of the external world and the activities of the organism or the mechanism of conditioned reflexes.' The development of the question of internal and external inhibition belongs to the years 1913-14. The tendency to equate the behavior of animals and humans, expressed in 1906, remained and was further expressed, and especially vividly in 1916, in I. P. Pavlov's speech on experimental pedagogy. In this speech, Pavlov for the first time raised the question of the presence in animals of the reflex of purpose: 'Analysis of the activity of animals and humans leads me to the conclusion that between reflexes a special reflex must be established—the reflex of purpose—the striving to possess a specific irritating object.' Further, analyzing the reflex of purpose, speaking of its importance, etc., Pavlov asserts that 'one must separate the very act of striving from the meaning and value of the purpose and that the essence of the matter lies in the striving itself, while the purpose is a secondary matter.' I. P. Pavlov connects the reflex of purpose with the basic strongest reflexes accompanying human life, namely with the food, orienting (investigative) reflex and with the sexual. The reflex of purpose, in Pavlov's opinion, needs to be cultivated in schoolchildren, it has 'enormous life significance, it is the basic form of life energy of each of us. Life is only bright and strong for him who throughout his life strives for a constantly attainable but never achievable goal.' All life, all its improvements, all its culture, everything is done only by the reflex of purpose. 'The reflex of purpose in Russian society was forgotten, and now before educators stands the task of cultivating this reflex of purpose. The reflex of purpose is absent in serfs, it was suppressed by the landlords, and the landlords thanks to serf ^T labor were accustomed to idleness. Now it is necessary to cultivate Russian society and cultivate the reflex of purpose.' Despite the biologization of social phenomena, the very posing of this question in the conditions of tsarism was a positive phenomenon. Following this speech in May 1917, a report was made on the reflex of freedom, and the reflex of freedom, like the reflex of purpose, was found in dogs. Reporting on one dog that reluctantly got on the experimental stand, I. P. Pavlov drew from this the conclusion about the presence in her of the reflex of freedom, which by analogy with the mentioned dog can be observed in human society. I. P. Pavlov was interested in the question of whether the food reflex or the reflex of freedom is stronger. I. P. Pavlov, having put a dog in solitary confinement and tormenting it with hunger, showed that the reflex of freedom can be suppressed by the food reflex.—The doctrine of the reflexes of purpose and freedom shows that Pavlov biologizes human society, representing it as a sum of bio. individuals. From his point of view, all the most complex social activity is nothing other than a simple accumulation of conditioned reflexes, which in turn are conditioned by unconditional reflexes—sexual, food, etc. After the revolution, thanks to the active help and care of the Soviet government, Pavlov's school continues to progress very strongly and to accumulate more and more material; quantitatively the school has expanded significantly. Thanks to the accumulation of ever larger materials, before Pavlov new and new positions emerge, giving him the possibility, already starting from facts, to come to certain generalizations and to increasingly turn to man. As early as 1918, Pavlov raised the question that it is necessary to transfer all achievements in the field of the physiology of higher nervous activity to man. The attempt at a neurophysiological analysis of pathological cases, conducted in 1918, was repeated in 1932 in a large psychiatric hospital in Leningrad in the form of organizing its own clinical department. One of the facts testifying to the growth of interests in Pavlov's school should be considered the raising of the question of sleep. Pavlov treats sleep as one of the types of general, so-called diffuse inhibition. Simultaneously with this, the position is put forward that partial inhibition leads to hypnosis.—The result of the enormous experimental work of I. P. Pavlov himself and his school up to 1923 was the publication of the book 'Twenty Years of Experience in the Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity of Animals.' From 1924, I. P. Pavlov began a cycle of lectures with an exposition in them of the experience of work on the large hemispheres of the dog's brain. These lectures constituted a separate book, published in the first edition in 1927, 'Lectures on the Work of the Large Hemispheres of the Brain.' In this book are set out all the basic works of Academician I. P. Pavlov's school on this question. This book was as it were a bridge connecting I. P. Pavlov and neurophysiology with the clinic, pathopsychology and neuropathology. None of the previous reflexologists gave such a huge experimental material as that given by Academician I. P. Pavlov and his school. The experimental works of I. P. Pavlov and his school made it possible to develop a new theory, the theory of conditioned reflexes, and thereby raised the doctrine of reflexes to a new step. Basically all the teaching of I. P. Pavlov, despite individual elements of agnosticism and dualism, is a materialistic teaching, proceeding from the positions of mechanistic materialism in its theoretical premises and some conclusions. The concrete experimental material reflects the dialectic of facts and does not fit into the methodological framework of Pavlov's interpretation. In a number of conclusions, built on the basis of concrete experimental material, such as on internal and external inhibition, on excitation and inhibition and their phases, on irradiation and concentration of excitation and inhibition, there are elements of spontaneous materialistic dialectic. Finally, the doctrine of conditioned reflexes and the transfer to clinical practice of the method of conditioned reflexes itself has a certain positive significance. The data of Pavlovian reflexology play a positive role in the struggle with the age-old enemy of materialism—idealism. This role will increase even more with the methodological rearmament of Academician Pavlov's school; the works of Academician I. P. Pavlov and his numerous school on human material in the conditions of the reorganized All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR will bring great benefit to clinical medicine and physiology. 4. Reflexological excursions into sociology. With the easy hand of I. P. Pavlov himself, who made an excursion into sociology by developing the reflexes of purpose and freedom, individual students of I. P. Pavlov began to speak more decisively about transferring everything obtained in R. to social relations. Biologization-reflexologization of social relations especially widely spread in the period 1920-27, when they tried to interpret a number of historical facts, revolutionary events, etc. from the point of view of conditioned reflexes. Most decisively on these questions spoke out Savich, Lenz, Frolov and others. Savich for example tried to fit all of human history, the revolution, in the end all creative processes of any scientist into the scheme of conditioned reflexes, to represent all this as inhibition, disinhibition, excitation, etc. He says that in the first period of the revolution the phase of excitation predominates, and then the phase of inhibition sets in. We encounter similar 'explanations' also in Bekhterev in his 'Collective Reflexology.' In the 'Russian Physiological Journal' (Volume V) Savich tries to review all history from the point of view of instincts, from the point of view of unconditional reflexes and the superimposition on these unconditional reflexes of conditional ones. Savich, proceeding to the analysis of the modern revolution, asserts that 'the main instincts—sexual, food, protective, investigative'—are the driving forces of the revolution, of which the sexual instinct is as it were 'the main basic institution.' Such vulgar biologization of social relations is not found even 'among the purveyors of vulgar materialism of the 19th century'—K. Vogt, Moleschott and Büchner. The reactionary nature of such views is self-evident.

No less vulgar reactionary excursions by Prof. Lenz in one of his articles in the journal 'Priroda' for 1924. The most complete views on the upbringing of the younger generation as the development of a sum of conditioned reflexes are given by Frolov in 'The Doctrine of Conditioned Reflexes as the Basis of Pedagogy,' where an analysis of all pedagogical schools is given from the point of view of the doctrine of conditioned reflexes. The starting point for Frolov is the reflex of purpose. Frolov considers that the main task of pedagogy is the development of the reflex of purpose. The next task of pedagogy is formulated as follows: 'Despite all the diversity of individual variations, the physiological ideal of upbringing is outlined quite clearly. This ideal is the development of a strong nervous system capable of resisting all kinds of breakdowns, of which modern life is so rich.' However, in defining the type of nervous system, Frolov approaches the issue based on an analysis of the types of nervous systems in dogs. Frolov believes that since all human behavior consists of numerous adaptive acts, upbringing should be built on the model of developing adaptive reactions to the external environment, therefore pedagogy is the science of developing conditioned reflexes in children. A vulgarized reflexological point of view in pedagogy was also propagated by Aryamov and A. B. Zalkind, and in neurology at one time by I. D. Sapir. All the above-mentioned reflexological excursions into sociology connect the simplifiers-reflexologists with Enchmen, who in 1922 presented 18 theses of a new biology. It was stated that the time would come when society would live only on the basis of physiology and each individual would have his physiol. passport, in which all the main physiol. constants of the individual would be indicated. The germs of such errors can be found in Pavlov himself in a work dating from 1909, in which it is stated that 'all life from the simplest to the most complex organisms, including of course man, is a long series of increasingly complex equilibria with the external environment up to the highest degree. The time will come—perhaps remote—when mathematical analysis, based on natural science, will embrace with majestic equations all these equilibria, finally including itself.' Excessive fascination with this very aspect of Pavlov's doctrine was also characteristic of certain unstable elements in the ranks of the Communist Party who had poorly grasped or were unwilling to grasp the teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. That is why Trotsky spoke so enthusiastically about this aspect of the theory of conditioned reflexes. An insufficiently critical attitude toward this aspect of reflexology was also shown by N. I. Bukharin, and Zinoviev, without understanding the essence of the matter, was overly hasty in his excessive praise. Based on the premises of I. P. Pavlov regarding the complete identification of the higher nervous activity of animals and humans, conditional-reflex work was begun on children and on the sick. Among the first works are those of Krasnogorsky, Ivanov-Smolensky, A. A. Yushchenko, etc.; among the second are the works of Prof. Lenz, Prof. Protasov, etc. As an example of methodological approaches, one can point to the works of Ivanov-Smolensky and his students. They started from a certain premise to show (as expressed in the preface to the collection of works) that the formation of positive and negative reflexes, all the higher nervous activity of a child, proceeds by the same mechanisms as in animals. This was the main objective. He wanted to prove that all pedagogical influence should be explained from the point of view of the conditioned-reflex mechanism, and subsequent works by his students proceed from the same premises. The main stumbling block and the main cause of all errors was the identification of the reflex activity of animals and humans, the biologization of social relations and the ignoring of human psychology as a special quality of highly organized matter; hence the attempts to eliminate psychology as a science about this quality and other erroneous conclusions. I. P. Pavlov himself in his struggle with idealistic psychologizing, in which the material substrate of neurophysiological processes is ignored, was sometimes inclined to simplify matters and draw an equal sign between animal and man. Excursions of physiologists into sociology and the explanation of social phenomena by neurophysiological mechanisms became a fashion in 1920-27. As shown above, authors often slid here into counterrevolutionary assertions. Finally, a whole reflexological trend appeared, which, while fighting with psychologists, was inclined to completely reject higher psych. processes and replace them with neurophysiol. mechanisms. In man as a social animal (Zoon politikon), according to the definition of K. Marx, as a class subject, behavior is determined by class interests. Higher psych. processes of man—memory, thinking, consciousness—are not immanently-subjective experiences, but are the product of the effect on the given individual of everything surrounding and first of all the social collective. Everything perceived is processed in the human head from the point of view of its class interests. Of course, higher psych. processes are not separated from the material substrate, their basis is neurophysiol. mechanisms, but the higher psych. processes themselves cannot be identified with neurophysiological ones. The doctrine of conditioned reflexes is of great interest for understanding a number of pathological phenomena in the central nervous system. This is well understood by the creator of the doctrine of conditioned reflexes himself—I. P. Pavlov. However, it would be erroneous to explain all psychopathological processes only by the neurophysiological mechanisms known to us. Finally, in the last two years, I. P. Pavlov made an attempt to decipher schizophrenia and hysteria and to show that these forms of disease, especially hysteria, can be entirely explained by the regularities of conditioned-reflex activity. In particular, he used material on experimental neuroses in dogs to interpret hysteria. It has already been said above that transferring what was obtained from animals directly to man is not always correct, especially when this transfer concerns phenomena such as higher nervous activity. One cannot categorically deny the fruitfulness of attempts at analogy and transfer, of course with due regard for the specific human peculiarities, since without this we would block our path to the expansion of experimental work. The introduction into the clinic of what was obtained by the school of I. P. Pavlov and the attempt to use the immense wealth of the doctrine of conditioned reflexes for the analysis of individual forms of nervous and mental diseases are very valuable. 5. Bekhterev's reflexological trend. If the reflexological trend of Academician I. P. Pavlov proceeded from the physiology of nervous activity and had its origin in Sechenov's reflexology, then the reflexological trend of Academician V. M. Bekhterev proceeded from the premises of studying the so-called objective psychology or psychoreflexology. The basic principles of this science were set forth in a number of articles by V. M. Bekhterev himself and his numerous school in the journal 'Obzor psikhiatrii, nevrologii i refleksologii' and finally received its most complete development in the books of Academician V. M. Bekhterev 'General Foundations of Reflexology' and 'Collective Reflexology.' All experimental work was carried out in a number of institutions of the Psychoneurological Academy on human material and in the V. M. Bekhterev Brain Institute. The main tasks set by Bekhterev and his school were reduced to studying and understanding the personality through external reactions, in particular by means of the motor method. At the same time, the need for a strictly objective study of the external manifestations of the human personality and its external relationships with the surrounding world was declared, in particular through the study of simple and combined reflexes. As starting principles, the premise of explaining the relationship of the organism with the surrounding environment through reflexes of defense and attack was adopted, which are as it were basic, on which other reflexes are layered and combined, including the orienting reflex, or the reflex of alertness. This already shows that the study of the reflex activity of man was approached based on the doctrine of the development of reflex activity in the plant and animal world, proceeding from the biogenesis of correlational activity, and the identification of plant, animal and human societies was the basic law of Bekhterev's trend. The innate reflexes themselves were divided by Bekhterev into exogenous and endogenous and in particular into three kinds: a) reflexes of self-preservation and nutrition, b) reflexes of preservation of the species or reproduction and c) social reflexes, and as will be shown later, social reflexes are determined, according to Bekhterev, by two kinds of biol. innate reflexes. Bekhterev starts from the premises of Ostwald on questions of energism and states that 'matter, studied by physics and chemistry, in its essence turns out to be as it were a fiction, for in place of atoms there is bound energy and at that energy of enormous force.'

He therefore declares: 'But if such matter is a fiction, and energy is the result, then there is no longer any basis to oppose the mental to the material, and conversely, we must ask ourselves: is there not a possibility to reduce mental activity to physical energy?' Thus, by dissolving matter into energy, Bekhterev seeks to make the force of energy simultaneously equivalent to both the physical and the mental, and thereby establish an energy equivalent for the entire organic and inorganic kingdom. Bekhterev connects reflexology with energism, saying: 'Reflexology, standing on an energetic viewpoint, considers the combinatory-reflex activity as a successive superstructure of inherited and acquired reflexes.' The identity in views between Bekhterev and Ostwald is clear from an analysis of Ostwald's statements, who, like Bekhterev, attempted to build higher mental processes (besides the abolition of matter) on the data of energism. Bekhterev defined consciousness based on the same energetic concepts, with the presence of confused agnostic positions. Agnostic positions are revealed where Bekhterev explains consciousness with the words of Du Bois-Reymond, who said that it is impossible to define consciousness, that we do not know the boundaries of consciousness, when it arose; what the qualities of this consciousness are, we do not know and will never know, etc. Bekhterev agrees with this position and, along with Du Bois-Reymond, cites the statements of Haeckel, Huxley, Bethe, and others. After presenting these positions, Bekhterev adds his own understanding of what he means by consciousness. First of all, he fully aligns himself with Haeckel's position on the unknowability of consciousness and declares that 'consciousness should be understood as all subjective things that a person discovers in himself.' Such is the final conclusion of Bekhterev based on a series of reflexological statements about mental activity. All the most complex differentiated acts of man, Bekhterev considers from the point of view of machine-like mechanical activity, including human creativity, scientific discoveries, etc. 'Creativity is a complex act of an offensive nature, creativity is a series of reflexes linked together to achieve a certain goal, and the goal is always given either in one's past experience or in the experience of others.' Along with mechanistic views, there also slips in a peculiar Machist understanding of experience. Along the line of explaining creativity, Bekhterev borrows something from Bergson in his explanation of the role of intuition in the creative act. To explain the mental activity of man with the data of energism, Bekhterev puts forward a number of principles, such as: the principle of selective generalization, the principle of substitution or compensation, the principle of inertia, the principle of selection, and finally the principle of dependent relationships between individual parts. In expounding the principle of dependent relationships, he most fully tells about the theory of equilibrium. 'Each individuality can be of varying complexity, it always represents a certain harmony of parts and has its form and relative stability of the system. Individuality ascends from the simplest to the most complex.' The most complex is understood in the order of an arithmetic sum. 'The harmony of parts is the basis of individuality, and therefore the harmony in the universe is a kind of harmony of parts of a large organism, based on the relationship, interaction of parts.' Thus, Bekhterev makes his R. some universal science, and of course he is alien to any historical-materialistic understanding of social relations, and he tries to build all this on the data of R. and biology. Bekhterev tried to correct Marx and subsume the biological category under all complex social relations, including trade, finance, and other economic factors. For example, Bekhterev asserts that 'demand, like supply, is often subject to the law of imitation and moreover the other by the law of inertia is implemented to a much greater extent than would be justified by the circumstances. On the other hand, demand and supply are subject to the law of differentiation, as well as other laws.' Moving on to the definition of the subject and method of collective R., Bekhterev declares that the task of collective R. is to study all social historical facts from the point of view of building all the most complex relationships on the basis of defensive and offensive reflexes. These reflexes equally dictate the behavior of an individual personality and the entire collective. All the complexity of social relations is built on them. In a number of places in his book, Bekhterev reveals his class orientation. This is all the more interesting as it pertains to 1920-21. Based on Spencer's theory of harmony, Bekhterev develops the theory of peaceful coexistence of classes and conciliation, quite sharply speaks out against the struggle between individual groups, i.e., between individual classes, declaring that 'if the process of cooperation and agreement usually leads to the strengthening of the groups entering into cooperation, then the process of struggle is associated with the mutual weakening of the participants in the struggle, which sometimes leads to the dominance of a third element.' In his book on collective reflexology, Bekhterev reaches political curiosities, such as explaining from the point of view of collective reflexes the lynching court in America as a reflex of self-preservation of whites or pogroms and robberies as a reflex of self-defense. Part of the book on collective R. is exclusively devoted to the analysis of historical and social phenomena based on the laws of mechanics and physics; the laws of conservation of energy, the law of proportional relationship of speed of motion with moving force, the law of gravitation, the law of selection, the law of counteraction, the law of periodicity, the law of inertia, etc. are analyzed, and it concludes with the conclusion* that the laws of energetics are applicable to social relations and the latter develop on the basis of physical laws. The presented 'scientific' excursions in the comments do not need any commentary, as they are expressive enough in themselves. It should be noted that along with such harmful orientations, we also have positive facts. Some students of Bekhterev, based on the data of Bekhterev's reflexology, give a concrete development of questions of child development, in particular along the line of genetic R. (Shelovanov and his school). The beginning of this teaching was laid by Bekhterev and Shelovanov back in 1913-14, but the development began in 1925. The theoretical justification of the teaching of genetic R. is that, based on the idea of development, Shelovanov began to study the development of reflexes in infants, but the interesting thing is that in tracing these biological reflexes in young children (up to a year) Shelovanov and his students grope for the correct understanding of the replacement of one group of reflexes by others in the process of child development. Tracing the development of differentiated reflexes in children, Shelovanov and his students are not alien to such statements that 'thus in development each subsequent period does not simply build on the previous one, but replaces it, significantly improving the relationship with the external world' ('Collection of articles on genetic reflexology'). Bekhterev's reflexological direction found great reflection in pathophysiology of the nervous system and in psychiatry. Individual students of Bekhterev and employees of the Institute named after him, trying to revise the mechanistic concepts of their teacher, fell into a Menshevizing idealism. This direction in Bekhterev's school was reflected in the works printed in 2 collections of the Institute in 1930: 'Reflexology or Psychology' and 'Reflexology and related directions', edited by Kurazov. There were those who tried to cover up mechanicism, eclecticism and individual idealistic statements of Bekhterev with the label of dialectical materialism. For example, Comrade Zalkind in the preface to the first collection 'New in reflexology' says that 'labor, class, professional and party cooperation in the proletarian collective, skills of exploitation and competitive struggle in the form of small and large bourgeoisie - all this is a variety of reflexes of social contact.' From the foregoing it follows that the limitations of R., its mechanistic nature, give idealists of all kinds the opportunity to use R. and, based on its limitations, to prove the existence of vital and creative forces and other idealistic assertions. Despite this, summarizing the teaching on reflective activity, we must recognize that the experimental development of questions of R. has rendered positive service in Soviet R., has rendered positive service in the development of experimental sciences and in the struggle of materialism with its ancient enemy - idealism. The data of R. have not yet been fully used by medicine. Further experimental development of R. and the use of these data by medicine are possible only on the path of the struggle for dialectical materialism and for mastering with the help of Marxist-Lenin theory the huge experimental material on reflexology.'