Psychometry

PSYCHOMETRY, in empirical psychology (Wundt and his school), that branch where experiments with reactions were described, which allegedly made it possible to calculate the exact duration of 'purely mental' processes. If in response to some simple irritation (a bell, a hammer tap, the lighting of a bulb, etc.), previously known to the subject, the subject responded with a previously conditioned simple movement (for example, by pressing a finger on a contact key button), then such a process was called a simple or 'natural' reaction. Even in this not-so-complex process, two different types of responding can be distinguished. If the subject's entire attention is focused on the finger movement, then such a reaction gradually begins to approach a semi-automatic movement, becomes extremely fast, and is called 'motor'. Another type of response will result if we ask the subject to focus all attention on the irritation and press the finger no earlier than he clearly perceives the given irritation. Since this is associated with the activation of perception (sensus), this reaction is called 'sensory'. It is significantly longer than the motor one. The time elapsed from the presentation of the irritation to the responsive movement is usually recorded by some precise instrument, most often a chronoscope (see Hipp chronoscope), which allows accounting for time intervals up to 0.001 sec. (which is called a 'sigma' and is denoted by the Greek letter σ). Both types of response can be 'cultivated' in the same subject. As for 'natural' reactions, in some subjects they approach motor ones, in others - sensory ones. In this way, attempts were made to study and classify the simplest 'volitional' processes, since it was assumed that the act of reaction includes awareness and decision. These experiments can be complicated on both the perception and comprehension side and the movement side. If the subject must distinguish a given irritation from several (previously shown to him), and only then react, then such a reaction is called a 'discrimination reaction' and usually lasts even longer than the sensory one. (Motor reaction usually proceeds within 0.080 to 0.180 sec., sensory - from 0.120 to 0.250 sec., discrimination reaction - 0.2-0.4.) Even longer is the 'recognition reaction', when the subject does not know in advance what irritation he will receive and must react no earlier than he recognizes the given irritation. Next in complexity is the 'choice reaction', when the subject not only distinguishes irritations but also responds differently, for example, to one color with one finger, to another with another. One can also ask the subject to respond to a word presented to him with another word, the first that comes to his mind ('free association reaction') or one that stands in a certain connection with it ('limited association'), for example, to select a predicate for a subject or a species concept for a genus concept, etc. Finally, one can elicit a judgment in the subject and also record the time of its duration. In this case, for the so-called empirical psychology, the greatest interest was not represented by the absolute figures of reaction duration, but by the difference between reactions. 'The simplest reaction process contains, however,' writes Wundt ('Outline of Psychology' § 14; 14a), 'besides the volitional process, always purely physiological links (conduction of sensory excitation to the brain, motor - to the muscle). If we insert further mental acts into the reaction process (acts of discrimination, recognition, simple associations, acts of choice), which of course is only possible with the complete form of reaction, then, subtracting from the time duration of the thus obtained complex reaction the time of the simple reaction, we can determine the time needed to perform strictly defined mental processes. Thus we obtain the time of recognition and discrimination of relatively simple impressions (colors, letters, short words) = 0.03-0.05 sec., time of association of memory = 0.3-0.8 sec., time of choice between two movements (right and left hand) = 0.06 sec., between ten movements (one of ten fingers) = 0.4 sec., etc.' It was assumed that the physiological process for simple and complex reaction is approximately the same - conduction of excitation to the center and from the center to the muscles, therefore the time that distinguishes one reaction from another was considered the duration of 'purely mental processes'. It was assumed that, for example, subtracting the time of the simple reaction from the duration of the discrimination reaction, one can obtain the duration of the mental process of discrimination, and subtracting the discrimination reaction from the choice reaction one can obtain the 'pure time' of the mental process of choice. It seemed that it was possible to measure mental processes, to approach them from a purely quantitative, mathematical side; therefore this section of reaction experiments received the name of psychometry. The volitional act seemed one of the most important, because 'all possible forms of connection of mental formations can also enter as elements into the composition of the volitional act' (Wundt, ibid.). Of course, one cannot deny the significance of reaction experiments. However, the interpretation of these experiments by subjective idealist psychologists was idealistic. It is necessary to assume that with the complication of the reaction, the physiological processes associated with it also become more complex. Therefore, one cannot speak of 'purely mental' duration, of purely mental processes. These attempts to isolate the 'purely mental' undoubtedly lead to its opposition to the physical, i.e., to the purest idealism. Meanwhile, the mental is a property of highly organized matter and outside this matter it does not exist. As the substrate of mental phenomena, we must always assume physiological processes. In human activity, the most important moment is consciousness, and no 'reduction' to physico-chemical processes can exhaust the essence of thinking, as Engels pointed out ('Dialectics of Nature', mechanical movement). However, the question is not so much about the 'measurement' of consciousness as about the study of its content, the class-ideological causes that form it, its concrete manifestation under the influence of historical conditions of human labor activity. Therefore, not denying the importance of reaction experiments, considering it necessary to expand them for studying the speed of reaction in a given specific situation, which has considerable psychotechnical significance, we cannot assign them to some special department of 'psychometry' and all the more consider it the main department of psychology. - K. N. Kornilov ('Doctrine of Human Reactions') fell into another error, who, however, denied the significance of reaction experiments as basic indicators of mental processes and objected to the very name 'psychometry'. But he completely deprived the human reaction of its volitional character, reducing it to a simple change in equilibrium between the organism and the environment. 'The environment acts on the organism and causes a responsive movement - the reaction of the organism'. Such a representation is fundamentally wrong, because it ignores the significance of consciousness (including class consciousness) and because it proceeds from the mechanistic theory of equilibrium. On the other hand, K. N. Kornilov tried to reduce all human activity to reactions, thereby denying the activity of the developing concrete historical personality with its consciousness, thought and other mental properties. The theory and practice of P. [Psychometry] are subject to reconstruction in the struggle with idealist and vulgar materialist trends in psychology.