Lamarckism

Lamarckism, a doctrine in biology that provides a special interpretation of the process of organic evolution. The founder of L. is the famous French naturalist Lamarck. In a series of works, beginning with the "Introductory Lecture to the Course in Zoology" of 1801, Lamarck for the first time clearly formulated the evolutionary idea in relation to the organic world. However, the credit for proving the reality of the evolutionary process in nature belongs not to Lamarck, but to Darwin. Lamarck limited himself to several general considerations regarding the relativity of the concept of "species," reference to the phenomena of changes in animals and plants during domestication, and reference to the duration of geological time. Being one of the founders of invertebrate paleontology, Lamarck failed to give a correct assessment of extinct organisms and even denied the existence of extinct species (except for those that had been exterminated by man). This circumstance is connected with Lamarck's general concept, in particular with his understanding of species (see). For Lamarck, all systematic categories, including species, are not only relative but also artificial. "One can confidently say that nature has formed among its creations neither classes, nor orders, nor families, nor genera, nor constant species, but only individuals that successively replace one another and resemble those from which they originated." Subsequently, however, while working on the taxonomy of plants and animals, Lamarck came to the conclusion about the possibility of establishing a sequential chain of forms from lower organisms to higher ones. His work on animal taxonomy finally strengthened in him, with respect to the larger divisions of the organic world, the popular in the late 18th century idea of the "ladder" of living beings. This series of increasingly complex forms was conceived by Lamarck as revealing nature's striving for ever greater perfection. The cause of this progressive improvement, in Lamarck's opinion, is a special internal principle of complexity of organization—the principle of gradation. The latter, however, does not manifest itself in its pure form, since external conditions 3 43 disrupt its correctness. "The present state of animals," writes Lamarck, "is on the one hand the result of the increasing complexity of organization, a complexity striving for correct gradation, and on the other—the result of the influence of extremely many and very different external circumstances constantly striving to disrupt the correctness of gradation in the complexity of organization." External conditions, constantly changing, modify the animal and plant world. Lamarck developed this part of his doctrine in great detail, but purely speculatively. The ways in which the external environment affects the organism are different; plants and lower "insentient" animals are modified by the direct action of the environment. Higher animals, however, possessing a nervous system ("sentient" and "rational") are changed by the influence of the environment only indirectly. A change in living conditions leads to the emergence of new needs, which in turn leads to the formation of new habits. New habits force animals to intensively exercise or, conversely, not exercise certain organs, which leads to strengthening or weakening of these organs. These changes are transmitted by inheritance and, continuing to develop further in the same direction, lead to the transformation of the species. A new need can even cause the formation of completely new organs, which arise "through the efforts of the inner feeling" of the animal. Lamarck establishes the primacy of function over form. These thoughts are formulated by him in the form of two laws. "First law. In every animal that has not reached the limit of its development, the more frequent and prolonged use of any organ gradually strengthens this organ, develops it, increases it and imparts to it strength proportional to the duration of its use, whereas the constant non-use of an organ imperceptibly weakens it, brings it to decay, progressively decreases its abilities and finally causes it to disappear. Second law. Everything that nature has made individuals acquire or lose under the influence of external circumstances in which their species has long been found, and therefore under the influence of the predominant use of a known organ or under the influence of the constant non-use of a known part—all this she preserves through reproduction in new individuals arising from the former, provided only that the acquired changes are common to both sexes or to those individuals from which the new ones originated." Lamarck illustrates these positions with a series of examples. Thus, in his opinion, the non-use of teeth for chewing food led to their disappearance in whales; in the mole living underground, the eyes have almost completely atrophied; the long legs of marsh birds are explained by the constant habit of these birds to stretch and lengthen their legs when walking through marshy soil. The anteater has a long tongue because it stretched it when obtaining food. The strongly developed tail and hind limbs of the kangaroo are explained by the fact that this animal moves by jumping, and when standing it rests on its legs and tail, etc. Incidentally, Lamarck was sufficiently consistent to extend his theory to the question of the origin of man. Thus, the driving forces of evolutionary development, in Lamarck's view, were on the one hand the internal psychic ("needs," "efforts," "will") principle of striving for perfection, and on the other—the modifying influence of external conditions. It is necessary to emphasize certain other aspects of his doctrine. This is first of all the confidence in the ability of organisms to purposefully change each time in response to changes in surrounding conditions. Secondly, Lamarck emphasized the psyche as a factor in the change of higher animals. "Feeling of need," "inner feeling" etc. can lead to the formation of new organs. These are the main points of Lamarck's understanding of evolution. Lamarck's views did not find favor, both due to the lack of factual substantiation and due to the social attitudes of the post-revolutionary era. Turning to a brief overview of the history of L., it is necessary to note that L. is a very diverse trend. Some Lamarckists highlight the autogenetic tendencies in evolution, others—the direct influence of external conditions, others—the indirect influence of the environment (exercise and non-exercise of organs), others—the psyche as a factor in evolution. The great morphologist Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, a contemporary of Lamarck and Cuvier, put forward as the main factor in evolution the direct influence of external conditions. "The environment is omnipotent in changing organisms," he writes. The organism appears to him as a passive element in relation to the environment; he did not attribute importance to the indirect influences of the environment, changes in animal habits, etc. Perhaps a common feature for all shades of L. is the idea of the direct adaptation of organisms to the environment. All Lamarckists endow organisms with the ability to purposefully change in response to changes in surrounding conditions. This occurs both with direct and indirect influence of the external environment. With this, L. explains the adaptation of organisms to the environment and their relative purposefulness. In the first half of the 19th century, L. remained a purely speculative trend of natural philosophy without further development. Its revival began after the victory of Darwinism, i.e., in the late 1860s. The famous German naturalist Ernst Haeckel in his "General Morphology" (1866) especially emphasized Lamarck's merits as an evolutionist. Haeckel tried to give the term L. an even broader meaning. Understanding Darwinism only as the theory of natural selection, Haeckel, based on considerations of historical order, called the idea of evolution as such L. Lamarckian factors of evolution Haeckel accepted along with the theory of selection, and some of the laws formulated by him (for example, the "law of accumulated adaptability," the "law of progressive inheritance") are purely Lamarckian in character. The first appearances of Herbert Spencer also date to the 1860s, who expressed the idea of development even before the appearance of Darwin's great work. However, only in the 1860s did H. Spencer in his "Principles of Biology" appear as a resolute defender of the idea of development in its Lamarckian understanding. Spencer believed that evolution reduces to the constant achievement of equilibrium between organisms and the environment. This unstable equilibrium can be achieved both indirectly (selection of individual organisms that proved to be more adapted to new environmental conditions) and by direct balancing, direct adaptation, which is conceived purely in a Lamarckian manner. The main factor in evolution Spencer considers direct balancing, while selection is assigned a secondary place. However, Spencer categorically rejected the second side of L., its autogenetic tendencies, considering "the striving of organisms for progress" and similar views as "a mask of ignorance under the appearance of knowledge." It is also necessary to note that in Spencer the justification of Lamarckian views is closely connected with the criticism of the theory of selection. In general, the flourishing of L. is largely connected with the criticism of Darwinism.

As early as the late 1860s and 1870s, a division of Lamarckism into two branches emerged—mechanolamarckism and psycholamarckism. Psycholamarckists placed the mind as the primary factor in evolution; mechanolamarckists, rejecting this viewpoint, sought the causes of evolution in the direct influence of the environment on the organism. Lamarckism gained wide acceptance in America among paleontologists during this time. A. Hyatt, Packard, and other researchers, assigning secondary importance to selection, considered the primary principle of development to be Lamarck's primary factors of evolution, the effects of which are fixed through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. A particularly prominent figure among American paleontologist-Lamarckists was Cope. Beginning in 1868, he developed Lamarck's doctrine in detail. All the main points of Lamarck's theory were elaborated by Cope. In evolution, Cope distinguishes between physiogenesis (direct physico-chemical action of the environment) and kinetogenesis (functional changes in organisms). Without denying the great significance of physiogenesis, Cope places main emphasis on kinetogenesis, developing from this perspective, for example, the formation of the spine, the development of joints, etc. The autogenetic side of Lamarckism received the name batmism from Cope. Under this term, Cope implied a special phylogenetic tendency of growth supposedly inherent in organisms. Finally, Cope dwells in great detail on the psychological factor of evolution and goes much further than Lamarck in this regard. Cope endows all organisms with mind. Moreover: he considers conscious acts and memory to be primary properties inherent in all organic matter. The moment of conscious response of organisms to changes in the environment, the 'conscious choice' of the environment, plays a major role in his theory. Calling consciousness and memory 'soul,' Cope writes the following unambiguous phrase: 'Evolution is the growth of the soul, and the soul is the father of forms in the living world.' This aspect of his doctrine allows Cope to be considered the founder of psycholamarckism. Psycholamarckists see the weakness of Lamarck in that he tried to connect the mind with the nervous system. They go beyond Lamarck and boldly endow every living cell with mind, speaking of a 'cellular soul' and ultimately arriving at panpsychism. The history of psycholamarckism largely coincides with the history of psychovitalism (see Vitalism). Evolution receives from psycholamarckists a very simple and naively anthropomorphic interpretation. Changes in surrounding conditions lead organisms or individual parts of organisms to realize what form they should take in order to correspond to the new environmental conditions and change purposefully. Heredity is interpreted as memory. Soon after Cope, a number of scientists put forward similar views, for example, S. Butler in America, Hermann Müller in Germany, Delpino and T. Vignoli in Italy. Psycholamarckism was particularly developed in detail by R. France, A. Pauly, and A. Wagner at the beginning of the 20th century. These scientists arrive at the following conclusions: the need perceived by organisms is at the same time the main cause of satisfying this same need. 'The process that accomplishes adaptation,' writes France, 'proceeds according to a teleological principle, and therefore the adapting organism or its constituent units, cells, must possess the faculty of judgment, which on the basis of perceptions directs their activity according to need.' And further: 'Instead of purely physical influences, we are forced to recognize actions of sensation and will caused by them, or in other words—reactions of the cellular soul as the deepest foundation of evolutionary theories as well as of all biological theories in general.' The structure of bone, the formation of valves in blood vessels (Pauly), the mutual adaptations of flower and insect (H. Müller), the phenomena of mimicry and mimesis (Pauly, France), etc., are explained by them from this point of view. The faculty of judgment is of course also attributed to lower animals and plants. Starting with criticism of mechanolamarckism, reproaching it with a deistic concept, psycholamarckists have recently slid into open mysticism, teleology, and combine the propagation of their ideas with collaboration in clerical journals. Starting from the 1870-1880s of the 19th century, along with psycholamarckism, mechanolamarckism also developed, the largest representatives of which are German scientists Nageli and Eimer (C. Nageli, Th. Eimer). Nageli treated evolution as a purely physiological problem and believed that it is based on mechanical phenomena. Although he, like Lamarck, recognized the indirect path of change in higher animals, he placed main emphasis on the principle of improvement and on the direct influence of the environment (which he designated as the 'theory of direct action'). The theory of heredity he developed (the theory of idioplasm) also includes the moment of hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics. The autogenetic tendency in Nageli is expressed in the 'principle of improvement,' although Nageli emphasizes that this principle is purely mechanical in nature. The Tübingen zoologist Th. Eimer is also a decided supporter of mechanolamarckism. He considers evolution as organic growth (organophysiology, orthogenesis), occurring in certain directions. These directions, according to Eimer, are determined on the one hand by the chemical composition and structure of the organism, and on the other by external influence. Eimer assigns great importance to the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics and, like Nageli and others, devotes much space to the criticism of the theory of selection. A number of researchers adhere to mechanolamarckism, with some emphasizing external factors of evolution, while others emphasize internal ones. These include Giard, Delage, O. Hertwig, Kassowitz, Haacke, I. Reinke, P. Kammerer, Wettstein, Warming, Abel, B. Dürken and others. Many scientists try to eclectically combine the principles of Lamarckism and Darwinism into one system (Haeckel, Romanes, Plate, Osborn and others). In this case, references are often made to Darwin, who partially also recognized the role of Lamarckian factors in transforming organisms. Among anthropologists, anatomists, ecologists, paleontologists, biogeographers, physiologists, and physicians, Lamarckism remains the dominant trend to this day. Virchow put forward a number of Lamarckian propositions at one time. In Russia, Lamarckism was defended by the anatomist P. Lesgaft, the botanist Polovtsev, and others. At present, mechanolamarckism is represented in the USSR by Vladimirsky, E. Smirnov, and others. In general, it should be noted that among biologists (excluding geneticists), as well as animal breeders and teachers, Lamarckism is the predominant trend. Methodology of Lamarckism. Any theory claiming to explain evolution must provide a rational interpretation of the diversity of the organic world and relative purposiveness. The problem of adaptation of organisms to the environment is the cardinal part of the theory of evolution. The starting point of Lamarckism is the idea that organisms have the ability to respond purposefully to changes in environmental conditions. And Lamarckist Wettstein is completely right when he defines the basic principle of Lamarckism as follows: 'All ideas concerning form-building that attribute to the organism the ability to respond purposefully, we can call Lamarckian, and the doctrine itself Lamarckism.' It should be pointed out that this basic principle of Lamarckism is completely untenable. In this case, the problem of organic purposiveness is not solved at all, because the main question is bypassed—why do organisms most often respond purposefully? Lamarck, instead of explaining the origin of the phenomenon of purposiveness, proceeds from it as something given, initial. What is to be explained is placed at the foundation of the explanation. A vicious circle results. The logic of Lamarckism leads to purely idealistic concepts of original purposiveness. Psycholamarckism explains purposive response by the fact that every organism, every one of its cells is endowed with mental abilities of sensation and judgment. 'The producer of bone substance—the bone cell, which gives rise to the most remarkable creation in a technical sense—the fine architecture of the skeleton, could not accomplish it if it were not informed by sensation of the general needs of the whole that determine its work,' writes psycholamarckist Pauly. Here we encounter a naive, anthropomorphic interpretation of the life activity of the cell. Consciousness, a complex quality of the highly organized nervous system, is arbitrarily extended to all of living nature and even to individual cells of the organism. Such an assumption does not withstand scientific criticism. Nevertheless, some Lamarckists have taken precisely this path of explaining organic purposiveness. Another part admits the action of some immanent, original purposiveness inherent in the organism as such. Despite the mechanistic views of Lamarck himself, the idealistic moment nevertheless plays the main role in his doctrine.

As for the mechanistic Lamarckians, they, usually not daring to use this kind of explanation, leave the question of the origin of organic purposiveness open and thus bypass the cornerstone problem of evolutionary theory. The sphere of Lamarckian explanation is also unusually limited by one circumstance. To a certain extent, the division of adaptations into passive and active is correct. Protective coloration and body shape can serve as examples of the former, the structure of the bone-muscular system as an example of the latter type of adaptation. According to even some Lamarckians, the principles of Lamarckism are insufficient to explain passive adaptations. Indeed, by what kind of 'exercise and non-exercise of organs' or direct environmental influence can one explain the formation of a groove for the outflow of poison in a snake's tooth, valves in the venous system of mammals, the spines of a hedgehog or porcupine, the protective coloration in animals, etc.? An enormous number of such adaptations cannot be explained in the spirit of Lamarckism at all. Indeed, it is even absurd to try to explain the spines of a porcupine by the 'exercise' of its skin, the structure of the stinging hairs of nettles by the influence of temperature, the 'egg' teeth of the embryos of certain reptiles and birds, which serve only once in life when breaking through the eggshell, by the action of exercise, etc. But the vast majority of adaptations are passive. Moreover: in any active organ there are a large number of features that cannot be explained in the spirit of Lamarckism. The chameleon's tongue, with which it 'shoots' at insects that serve as its food, is thickened at the end, provided with a series of glands that secrete sticky mucus, has a central cartilaginous body, the most complex musculature, etc. Undoubtedly, the ancestors of the chameleon possessed the tongue of an ordinary lizard; but it is unclear by what 'exercise' of the tongue one can explain its form, as we encounter it in the modern chameleon. Similarly, a large number of active parts in the sense organs are completely impossible to explain based on Lamarckian concepts. Even the work of a muscle is based, as new research by Bozler, Riesser (E. Bozler, O. Riesser) and others has shown, on a number of such fine-structural and biochemical features that cannot be formed by any exercise or non-exercise. On the contrary, for the functioning of the muscle, these features must already be present. Here we have come very close to the question of the relationship between function and structure. Lamarckism proceeds from the primacy of function, considering that function creates the organ. This concept is incorrect, since it is obvious that the existence of one or another function already presupposes the presence of a 'material basis' in the form of a specific organ. If the principle of Lamarckian explanation of evolution turns out to be untenable, then the other basic assumption of Lamarckism—the possibility of transmitting acquired characteristics to offspring—also lacks solid scientific foundations. The resolution of this question (as well as a number of other problems of heredity) has enormous significance for evolutionary theory. The question itself should be formulated as follows: can changes acquired by the body of an organism be reflected in its idioplasm and adequately, equivalently change the hereditary substance, i.e., the genes located in the chromosomes? Can an athlete's muscle, for example, adequately change the genes on which the development of this muscle depends, and will the athlete's offspring also possess hypertrophied muscles? Lamarck, formulating his second law, proceeded from the fact that acquired characteristics are inherited. All neo-Lamarckians proceed from the same assumption. In this case, reference is usually made to both indirect data and the results of experimental work. The favorite indirect 'proofs' of the inheritance of acquired characteristics in the polemics of Lamarckians against Darwinists are references to the reduction of various organs, e.g., the pelvis in whales and sirenians, the eyes in moles and cave animals, the teeth in turtles, etc., and more recently especially to immunity, to the embryonic laying down of a callus on the wrist joints of the African wart hog (Phacochoerus), and to the presence of thickening of the skin of the sole in the human embryo (already noted by C. Darwin in his time), as well as to the rupture of the gill cover in tadpoles when the forelimb is amputated, which normally supposedly causes perforation of the cover. Not to mention that when an experimental approach to the problem is possible, indirect evidence in general is devalued, all these 'proofs' can be countered with countless examples of other indirect data that cannot be explained by Lamarckism, but only by selectionism, while the aforementioned Lamarckian proofs can also be explained by Darwinism. Lamarckism is completely unable to explain, for example, the numerous adaptations of insect pupae, which do not exercise their chitinous external organs, the laying down in insects of wings, limbs, joints, etc. even during the pupal stage, the chitinous shell of arthropods, the shells of mollusks, etc., which do not change through exercise, etc. As for calluses, they can be excellently explained by selection, which by no means excludes the possibility of early (fetal) laying down of an adaptive characteristic; finally, the rupture of the gill cover in a tadpole according to the latest data does not take place at all if the amputation of the limb is performed more carefully and in addition a number of skin glands are also extirpated. If we turn to experiments, then here all attempts to prove the existence of adequate heredity of acquired characteristics (the so-called somatic induction) have proven unsuccessful. The number of such experiments is enormous. Experiments on butterflies by Standfuss, Fischer, Schröder, experiments on salamanders, the midwife toad by Kammerer, experiments by Stockard and others on guinea pigs, experiments by Guthrie on chickens and Magnus on rabbits are especially popular among Lamarckians. However, all these experiments could not withstand the criticism of geneticists. Upon verification, most experiments proved untenable in their methodology, while the others prove the existence of a number of interesting variants of so-called pseudo-heredity (long-term modifications, blastophoria, etc.). A presentation of all these experiments on the inheritance of acquired characteristics is found in all manuals on the theory of heredity (for more details—see Heredity). Even honest Lamarckians, with an objective approach to the matter, must admit that at present there is not a single experimentally obtained fact that really proves inheritance according to the type of somatic induction (A. P. Vladimirsky). As for attempts to explain the mechanism of the supposed transmission of acquired characteristics, they were already made by Darwin himself in his theory of 'pangenesis' and by Haeckel in his hypothesis of 'perigenesis of plastidules'; then—by means of a nerve-¹ connection (Hering, Tornier, Schlater), hormones (O. Hertwig, Cassirer, Hatschek), autocatalysts (Werner, Schmalhausen) or a special 'dynamic connection' (Plate). However, all these purely speculative constructions do not save Lamarckism, because the very fact of transmission is refuted by modern genetics. Giving a general philosophical assessment of Lamarckism, one can say that it is an excellent example of an eclectic system of views in which mechanistic and idealistic views are closely intertwined. Finally, the question of Lamarck's own Lamarckism is interesting. In this respect, we find among biologists a great diversity of opinions. Cassirer, Lotsy and others consider Lamarck a mechanist, Pauly, Detto and other researchers classify Lamarck as an idealist. Komarov considers the idealistic (and religious) passages in Lamarck's works as a mask, but the psycho-Lamarckian A. Wagner believes that it is precisely all the purely mechanistic expressions of Lamarck that are a mask. The reason for all these contradictions in the assessment of Lamarck is that in his system purely mechanistic and purely idealistic (sometimes deistic) views are indeed intertwined. Therefore, to consider certain moments in Lamarck's views as a random masking element, etc., there are no sufficient grounds. Lamarckism of Lamarck himself and Lamarckism of mechanistic and psycho-Lamarckians is in essence one and the same system, which does not withstand criticism either from a factual or methodological standpoint.