Affect

AFFECT (from Latin affectus—state of mind), a term used to denote phenomena in the realm of feeling. The most ancient explanation of the word affect is found in Augustine, who equates it to the Latin perturbatio. Thus, in this meaning, which passed into medieval literature, the term affect is approximately equal to the term "passion" (passio). This meaning receives further development in Descartes and especially in Spinoza. In this sense—of passion and a violent manifestation of feeling producing disturbances in mental life—the word affect is widely used in the literature of the 18th century, and this meaning, by tradition, still dominates in criminal and psychiatric literature to this day. But already in that same 18th century, some English writers draw a distinction between affect and passion from the point of view of their duration and activity. Emotional phenomena are closely adjacent to affective phenomena. At the present time, there exists a tendency to view affects and emotions as functions of different sections of a special reflex arc, whereby affect is associated with the afferent part of this arc; upon the switching of the nerve impulse to motor pathways (pyramidal, extrapyramidal), emotions are produced, which are conducted by the efferent part of the arc. However, such a strict demarcation can hardly be fully implemented at the present time, especially in the clinic. —A distinction is made between sthenic, or excitatory, affects (joy, hatred, anger, etc.) and asthenic, or inhibitory, ones (melancholy, shame, fear, etc.). Extremely characteristic of affects is their irradiation into the somatic realm. Affects manifest somatically: 1) in dilation of the pupils; 2) in changes in the cardiovascular system; 3) in acceleration, more rarely slowing, of the pulse, flushing, pallor, increase in blood pressure, etc.; 4) in an increase in tendon reflexes, trembling, etc.; 5) in the effect on lacrimation, perspiration, and salivation; 6) in the effect on the endocrine system; and 7) in the influence on so-called expressive movements (mimicry, gestures, etc.). These symptoms are especially sharply marked in so-called inhibitory affects, while sthenic affects are accompanied for the most part only by dilation of the pupils and insignificant vasomotor changes. Reflecting on the soma, affects, in turn, depend on the general somatic state (fear in cardiac patients, euphoria in the tuberculous, agitation in Basedow's disease patients, etc.). Furthermore, affects reflect on intellectual activity, as well as on the will and behavior, serving as a stimulus for them. However, heightened affectivity can also unfavorably influence the capacity for perception, thinking, judgment, etc. In severe psychic insults, it may come to pass, even in completely healthy people, that there is a splitting between affect and intellect, to an "affective paralysis," while at the same time lively intellectual activity is observed. Bleuler combines affectivity, drives, and will into one concept of ergia, emphasizing the influence that affectivity exerts on volitional and centrifugal functions. Affects play a huge role in psychopathology; according to Bleuler, almost all psychopaths are thymopaths, i.e., they are ill with affects. Disorders of affectivity are very diverse. Disorders of a quantitative nature include a decrease in affective excitability (apathy, indifference, etc.) and an increase in excitability (euphoria, irritability, etc.). Qualitative changes in affectivity include so-called perverted affects (e.g., joy regarding sad events and vice versa) and affective ambivalence (see). The indicated changes in affective excitability can be either prolonged, constituting the essence of one or another constitution and basic mood, or they appear as episodic reactions. If affects arise without motivation, have a rapid and violent development, produce a sharp vascular reaction, and are associated with greater or lesser clouding of consciousness and amnesia, then one speaks of a pathological affect. It is not always easy to decide where to classify a given affect—as normal or pathological. Meanwhile, this question is of paramount importance in forensic psychiatric practice, when it is necessary to resolve the question of sanity and responsibility for what was committed in a state of affect. The difficulty of resolving this question is conditioned by the fact that such affects for the most part do not leave objective traces; meanwhile, the question of simulation very often arises. As for the theory of affectivity, it must be said that the concept of affect has lost its former, purely psychological meaning. The metaphysical (according to Wundt, intellectualistic) theory of affect of the end of the 19th century was replaced by the James-Lange theory, which placed the emphasis not on the psychic, but on the somatic content of affect. Both authors said that we do not tremble because we are afraid, but, on the contrary, we are afraid precisely because we tremble. This theory, very important for understanding the material substrate of affective reactions, is, however, dualistic, insofar as it demarcates the psychic and the physical as two separate series of phenomena. In contrast to this theory, Wundt put forward an emotional theory, which views affect as a phenomenon of a psycho-physical order, in which both moments—both the psychic and the somatic—are of equal value. Experimental psychological works conducted in connection with this theory proved fruitful. Wundt studied the regularity of the relationships between emotions and changes in the pulse and allowed that it is possible to judge the type of emotion by changes in the pulse. At the present time, we can consider the influence of affect on respiration, the cardiovascular system, the motor apparatus, and, recently, on chemical processes, in particular on metabolism and the activity of endocrine glands (primarily the adrenal glands and the thyroid gland), to be fully elucidated. Of great interest in this direction are the experiments of Cannon, who set dogs on cats that were in a cage, and, in connection with the induced reaction of fear, found glucosuria and hyperglycemia in the cats, explained by the intensified action of the adrenal glands. Significant successes can also be noted regarding the question of attempts at cerebral localization of affective processes. All sensations coming from the periphery enter the optic thalami, from where they are directed further to special cortical zones. The region of the optic thalami, in particular the walls of the third ventricle and the cerebral aqueduct, are simultaneously the physiological center for affectivity, which is inseparably linked with sensations. The proximity of the thalamus to the diencephalon (serving as the center of the autonomic nervous system) and to the motor subcortical ganglia explains to us the connection existing between affectivity, drives, and automatic motor functions.

M. Sersky. Affectivity, the totality of psychic phenomena colored by shades of pleasure or displeasure and in traditional psychology usually called feelings (consequently, this includes not only affects, but also other states related to them). Synonyms for affect are the expressions: "life of feelings," "emotional life." Bleuler, who was the first to begin using this term widely in psychiatric literature, considers affectivity to be the basis of the human personality, determining both the character of basic drives and the direction of thoughts and actions. Pathological affect from a forensic medical point of view. In criminal law, the question of the influence and significance of Affect is considered very complex and controversial. On one hand, irresponsibility for offenses committed in a state of affect cannot be allowed, otherwise one would have to embark on the path of recognizing every lack of restraint; on the other hand, Affect, as an excitation accompanied by material changes throughout the organism, influences psychic activity, and consequently, sanity (see). It is customary to distinguish 1) physiological affects, 2) affects on a pathological basis, differing from physiological ones by their intensity and disproportion to the causes that provoked them, and 3) pathological affects, characterized by a deep clouding of consciousness. But such a division is artificial; it is almost impossible to draw boundaries between them. In the legal sense, pathological Affect is characterized by such changes in consciousness, under which a correct assessment of the surroundings, the ability to choose motives for action, and the ability to control one's actions become impossible. Article 11 of the Criminal Code, 1926 edition, by introducing the concept of a temporary disorder of mental activity, establishes the following limitations of this concept: "If these persons could not account for their actions or control them." Thus, the Criminal Code, using formally only a psychological criterion, sets two conditions: the first is the capacity for judgment (libertas judicii), i.e., a person's understanding of the meaning and properties of their deeds and, among other things, the knowledge that certain actions are prohibited by law; the second and most important is libertas consilii—the possibility of making a choice between different motives for action. Not always, when a person is aware of what they are doing and remembers it afterwards, can they control their actions. In many psychopathic states accompanied by a change in the volume and clarity of consciousness, the capacity for judgment may be preserved; however, the ability to choose between different motives for action is impaired. That is why using only one criterion—"amnesia"—when diagnosing pathological Affect is clearly insufficient and incorrect. Diagnosing pathological Affect is one of the most difficult, sometimes completely impossible, tasks in forensic psychiatry. An examination should never be based solely on the character or method of committing a crime and, based on this, provide a conclusion about a disease. The complexity in diagnosing pathological Affects is further aggravated by the fact that they are sometimes so lightning-fast that they are completely missed by outside observation and are not even realized by the patient themselves (only the act itself raises suspicion of the presence of a pathological state), and also by the fact that the Affects and impulses of a healthy period can find their expression during a mental disorder. The content of normal consciousness can pass into a pathologically altered consciousness, especially when it is filled with ideas with a strong emotional coloring (jealousy, revenge, ideas of damage, etc.). In pathological Affect, as in pathological intoxication, actions are often performed, the aggressive ideas about which have long found their expression in repeatedly uttered threats, remarks, etc. Then these actions may seem to be the result of a deliberate intention. Furthermore, a pathological reaction may develop not immediately and not directly following an external trigger. Often, an affect builds up very slowly. In such cases, despite the presence of seemingly psychologically understandable motives that correspond to the given personality, actions that appear planned, purposeful, and allegedly stemming from deliberation, of course, cannot be considered as such. It should be remembered that a paradoxical affect, just like an irresistible impulse, often points to latent schizophrenia (see). The study of the personality as a whole, in all its complexity, in its dynamic development and in its relationship with the environment, as well as the study of even insignificant collateral circumstances, are the conditions that alone allow for a correct assessment of individual reactions, individual states, in which the court is interested when the question of a short-term disorder of mental activity is raised. The solution to the practical question—what provides the basis for considering affective discharges pathological—is facilitated by comparing them with normal ones, as well as by recognizing the character of that predisposition, that physical readiness, against the background of which they appear. Sometimes this pathological affectivity is acquired as a consequence of various harmful factors (organic psychoses, chronic alcoholism, drugs, head injuries, infections, tuberculous intoxication, exhaustion, etc.); sometimes it is a permanent state, a kind of anomaly of the psychic makeup. It is especially vividly expressed in epileptics and in psychopaths prone to affective breakdowns. Among the latter, epileptoids stand in the first place, who, due to their explosiveness, belong to severe criminal types. In some, pathological affective discharges appear only outside of ordinary conditions (intoxication, heat, emotional shock, severe overwork, etc.). In the age of puberty and menopause, in the menstrual (especially in the premenstrual days) and postpartum periods, as well as in malaria patients during latent attacks, pathological affects can arise for a trivial reason and reach extreme intensity. The discrepancy between the stimulus and the reaction, when the stimulus, like a short circuit, is converted into an affective reaction, when the regulating and inhibitory instances of higher neuro-psychic activity are breached or almost completely absent and a lightning-fast discharge of affect occurs, leading to incorrect, sometimes absurd actions, sometimes reaching senseless rage and violence, its height, strength, duration—all these moments point to the pathological nature of the affect. Concomitant phenomena of a physical and psychic order complement and clarify the picture. The former are very significant, as they can be objectively established by witness testimony. During an affect, significant changes occur throughout the organism: 1) disorder of blood circulation, respiration, and secretory activity (acceleration or slowing of the pulse, pallor or flushing of the face, rapid or slowed breathing, sweating, dizziness, etc.); 2) motor phenomena (trembling, screaming, etc.); 3) after the end, or rather the discharge of the affective state, a peculiar reaction occurs, characterized by exhaustion of psychic and physical forces (fatigue, feeling broken, indifference, and often sleep). Thus, Affect changes the whole person, and, it is understandable, in this state everyone, strictly speaking, is not guaranteed against committing an offense. Of course, the more harmonious the personality, the more cultured the person, i.e., the more favorable the socio-economic conditions, the more developed the restraining, inhibitory principles, the more difficult it is for an Affect to arise and the weaker it is in its intensity. Unaffected intellectual activity does not exclude emotional and volitional disorder. "A thousand-fold experience teaches us that a perfectly satisfactory psychic baggage in itself may turn out to be completely insufficient when colliding with abnormally developed instincts" (Berze). Of the psychic manifestations, changes in consciousness observed in severe cases are of particularly important significance—clouding, narrowing, disturbance of coherence between its individual contents, entailing, in turn, disorders of the capacity for judgment and criticism. One of the valuable indications of the presence of pathological Affect can be the confirmation of similar states in the past of the subject, not connected with criminal prosecution, as well as intolerance to alcohol, which often plays a provoking role in such short-term disorders of psychic activity. The senselessness of the act and confusion during its commission, immense excessive cruelty, lack of elementary caution—almost always speak in favor of a pathological change in consciousness. Subsequent complete or partial amnesia has very great, but, as stated above, not decisive significance. The fact is that memories of events during the most severe disorders of mental activity can be preserved in full volume and vividness. In the question of amnesia, one always has to reckon with the possibility of simulation (see). In this regard, it should be borne in mind that memory can also be simulated, just like amnesia, and that false memories are also always possible.

When resolving the question of amnesia, one should always keep in mind that in some cases a lost memory may be reproduced again, either fully or partially, by means of a completely accidental stimulus, for example, a word accidentally dropped during an interrogation; in others, a memory already reproduced, for example, in testimony shortly after a crime, may subsequently disappear from memory entirely. Only a thorough investigation of even the most insignificant facts pointing to clear consciousness on the one hand, and to an alteration of it on the other, their objective analysis and comparison, along with a study of both the person who committed the act and all internal and external conditions, allow one to arrive at a probable conclusion. The criminogenic significance of pathological Affect is extremely great and is determined by aggressiveness of varying degrees, up to the most cruel violent acts. The stronger the internal tension, the stronger the affective outburst. Pathological Affect in all cases so strongly disrupts neuro-psychic activity and the normal volitional act that, under any circumstances, criminal liability is excluded. The exclusion of counter-motives and criticism, and the strength of the affect, which breaks through all barriers and disengages the brakes, are sufficient for proof. Regarding the influence of physiological Affect on the degree of liability, there is a special provision in Art. 48, item 'e' of the Criminal Code. If a crime is committed 'under the influence of strong emotional agitation,' then, when determining the measure of social defense, this agitation is recognized as a mitigating circumstance. In the Special Part of the Criminal Code, in Articles 138 and 144, the law points to only one category of affects—'suddenly arisen strong emotional agitation,' on the condition that this affect was 'caused by violence against the person or a grave insult on the part of the victim.'