Organism

Organism, a collection of interacting organs that form an animal or plant. The word O. itself comes from the Greek organon, that is, a product or instrument. Apparently, Aristotle was the first to call living beings organisms, because according to his views, a living being is an instrument for the soul that governs its actions. From the modern point of view, an O. can be considered as a structurally complex material system that, in the living state, possesses the following characteristic features: purposeful adaptation to specific conditions of existence (see Purposefulness), metabolism, growth, reproduction, and irritability. Taken separately, these features have their analogies in certain features of liquid crystals. But their specific, historically formed connection in a single system makes them, due to their constant interaction within this system, different from what they are in liquid crystals. The simplest O.'s are the protozoa. The development of cell theory led to the view of the cell as an "elementary organism" (Brucke, 1861), a view in which the cell is considered as a unit possessing all the basic life properties of multicellular organisms. The basis for this is the fact that cells possess both metabolism and irritability, and reproduction, and purposeful adaptation. From this, the mechanists concluded that the explanation of the laws of multicellular O.'s must consist in the summation of qualities characteristic of protozoa, because from their point of view, to explain a phenomenon means to reduce a more "complex" regularity to a "simple" regularity, in our case—the regularity of phenomena in an O. to the regularity of phenomena in a cell, and phenomena in the latter to the regularities of chemistry and physics. This mechanistic approach, which at one time played a positive role as a first approximation to a materialistic analysis of life phenomena, nevertheless proved unable to explain the qualitative uniqueness of multicellular formations, because the cell of a multicellular organism, despite possessing basic life properties, is not adapted to independent existence and self-preservation; while on the other hand, multicellular O.'s possess non-cellular structures (intercellular substance and syncytia). The isolated existence of cells outside an O. in so-called tissue cultures (see Tissue cultures) shows that individual cells (e.g., blastomeres) or pieces of tissue or individual organs exist only with constant supply of nutrient material in a laboratory setting. Proponents of the view of the cell as an "elementary organism" usually consider protozoa as an example of the independent existence of a simple cell. However, modern protistology increasingly leads to the conviction of the incorrectness of identifying protozoa with cells of multicellular O.'s. A protozoan animal (e.g., Plasmodium malariae) or plant (e.g., Bacillus typhi) should be compared not with individual cells of a multicellular O., but with an entire multicellular organism. In protozoa, the functional differentiation of the O. is carried out by the division of functions between specialized formations, so-called organelles or organellae, within a single plasma body. The view of the cell as a structureless formation was abandoned long ago. Careful research has discovered in a number of protozoa analogs of many basic organ systems of multicellular organisms, e.g., skeletal, contractile, motor, neuromotor, and light-sensitive formations, as well as permanent contractile vacuoles and other organelles. We thus see a complex differentiation and division of functions for the purpose of adaptation to conditions of existence already in protozoa. Hence it follows that it is more correct to consider protozoa as non-cellular O.'s than as unicellular (Dobell and others). Similar errors are made by mechanistic biology also in the question of the unity and integrity of the Organism. The organism as a whole is attempted to be explained entirely by the summation of the regularities of its parts. "It is true, they say, that an animal consists of bones, muscles, nerves, etc., but it is immediately clear that this does not have the meaning that the statement has that a piece of granite consists of the above-mentioned (quartz, feldspar, mica) substances. These substances are completely indifferent to their combination and can exist just as well without this combination; whereas the various parts and members of the organic body are preserved only in their combination and, separated from one another, they cease to exist as such" (Hegel). Endorsing this thought of Hegel, F. Engels says on this subject: "Neither the mechanical addition of bones, blood, cartilage, muscles, tissues, etc., nor the chemical—of elements—constitutes an animal yet. An O. is neither simple nor composite, however complex it may be." Nevertheless, a variety of the mechanistic view of the O. as a sum of cells, the view that a multicellular O. is a "state" or "colony" of cells, is still dominant today. Meanwhile, this is incorrect even from the factual side. As is known, in animals a clear division into individual cells is observed only in the early stages of embryonic development, and even then not in all. Thus, in the development of eggs rich in yolk, e.g., in insects, we generally do not observe typical and complete division into individual cells (blastomeres); the nuclei multiply and only after they have distributed themselves to the periphery of the egg plasma do boundaries form between them, immediately breaking up the surface of the egg into a series of cells. But even in animals with more or less complete cleavage, the adult organism shows cellular demarcation only with respect to a very small number of tissues (e.g., epithelium). Usually in the animal body we do not find distinct cell walls. Moreover, a number of tissue systems, e.g., connective tissue, often show no cellular isolation. Often in O.'s there occur so-called syncytial, or polyenergidic formations, i.e., multinucleate non-cellular plasma territories (see Syncytium). An excellent example of an entire syncytial O. is the alga Caulerpa, which reaches tens of centimeters in length. In it, no division into cells is found, which at first led to the representation of Caulerpa as a single giant cell. In reality, hundreds of nuclei are scattered in the plasma of Caulerpa. Despite its non-cellular character, Caulerpa is a relatively well-differentiated O., having all the basic analogs of organs of a green plant: leaf-like outgrowths with chlorophyll grains, an elongated "stem" and root-like outgrowths. True, in plant O.'s the division into cells usually occurs in a much more distinct and universal form, but this does not change the fundamental aspect of the matter. In any case, one cannot agree with the view: "What atoms, elements, of which bodies consist and are composed are for the chemist, that cells are for the biologist" (M. Hartmann), because if all chemical substances are compounds of elements and these latter can be obtained from them by decomposition, then O.'s are not compounds of cells and only cells. Moreover: the qualities and properties of a complex substance do not represent the sum of the properties of its constituent elements, although they are determined by the properties of the latter. This is also true for chemistry. When elements combine, new qualities are formed in which the qualities of the elements are realized in a "sublated" form. With even less right can we speak of the qualities of an O. as the sum of the properties of cells—as well as of any other parts (tissues, organs, etc.). In general, it should be considered that a multicellular O. represents a new type of differentiation and division of functions, in which, in contrast to non-cellular O.'s, cellular structure is basically used. The unity and integrity of the O. are often denied as a result of confusing these concepts with the concept of the individuality of the O. The concept of an individual, i.e., something indivisible, is very relative, and the degree of individuality varies specifically for different O.'s. Usually, the regenerative capacity of the O. and its parts (see Regeneration) is considered as the criterion of this degree. As is known, in plants, protozoa, coelenterates, and some other lower O.'s, parts of the body possess to a certain degree the ability to restore the entire O.: This even gave grounds to consider such O.'s as divisible O.'s, or "dividuals" (Isaev). However, this by no means contradicts the conception of the O. as a single and integral system, because we must consider the regenerative or regulatory process as the restoration of the violated unity and integrity of the O. If we in the hydra, for example, recognize, like any O., the properties of unity and integrity, we will not refuse this only because as a result of regeneration a series of new hydras are formed from it, whereby we obtain not one, but a series of O.'s, each of which possesses the same properties of unity and integrity. Consequently, the phenomenon of regeneration not only does not refute the existence of unity and integrity of the O., but is a brilliant proof in favor of their existence.

In this sense, a complete parallel can be drawn between regeneration and reproduction. The phenomenon of reproduction is also connected with another aspect of the relativity of the concept of organism. A new organism usually arises from a 'part' (an egg) of the previous one. The regularities of the formation of an organism from an egg through embryonic development precisely ensure and realize its unity and integrity (see Mechanics of Development). The individual organism is that elementary unit that, through reproduction, ensures the continuity of the species over time. Usually, the concept of an individual organism coincides with the concept of an organism. However, there is a special form of organisms—colonial organisms, which represent the constant coexistence of a series of individuals. In the most primitive cases of colonies, the individuals forming them are equivalent and possess all the abilities of an organism (colonial protozoa, Eudorina, Pandorina). However, at further stages of development of colonial organisms, we observe an increasing differentiation of functions between individuals, accompanied by increasing one-sidedness of functions, one-sided specialization. Reproduction is the function first to be specialized (e.g. in Volvox). It is precisely this differentiation of functions among individual cells of colonial protozoa that allows us to consider them as transitional forms from non-cellular to multicellular organisms (Metazoa and Metaphyta). But even in typical multicellular organisms, there are colonial organisms with great specialization of their constituent parts. This includes, for example, colonies of siphonophores. However, in this case, it is only in a very conditional sense that one can speak of a colony, because the individual parts of such organisms cannot be called individuals in the exact sense, since the individual has already become an organ. The same must be said, although in a somewhat different aspect, in relation to segmented worms (tapeworms and ringed worms), whose bodies are divided into individual segments, in which all or almost all organs are repeated serially. Here, the individual segments are not characteristic in themselves, but as part of the whole worm, although they possess a certain individuality. In all these cases, both a typical colony and a segmented organism, we must always consider as unified and complete organisms. A unique phenomenon is the association of different organisms in symbiosis (see). In most cases, symbiosis does not have the character of an obligatory prerequisite for the existence of its components, but there are still a number of cases in which symbiotic organisms are incapable of separate existence. Thus, in orchids, germination of seeds does not occur if they are not infected by a certain fungus. As is known, leguminous plants cannot grow in nitrogen-free soil if they are not infected by the microorganism Bacterium radicicola, which lives on their roots. Finally, lichens are by most botanists considered as the cohabitation of a fungus with a green alga, by some as symbiotic, by others as parasitic. Such facts have led some scientists to a special theory of symbiogenesis, according to which all organisms (at least plant organisms) originated as a result of the symbiotic combination of elementary organisms. The extreme expression of this viewpoint is the recognition of plastids of plant cells and even cell nuclei as separate organisms. The crude mechanical simplification of the evolutionary process connects this theory with the hybridization theory of Lotsy, who in the evolutionary process saw not the emergence of something new, but only the recombination of the originally given genes (see Evolutionary Theories). One of the main criteria for clarifying the evolution of the basic forms of organisms is the nature of metabolism. At present, organisms are distinguished by the method of formation of basic organic substances: 1) heterotrophic organisms, i.e., those lacking the ability to assimilate carbon and nitrogen from inorganic compounds and therefore needing ready-made organic substances (mainly animals), 2) autotrophic organisms, capable of assimilating carbon from inorganic compounds through photosynthesis (green plants), and 3) organisms capable of assimilating carbon and nitrogen from inorganic compounds through chemosynthesis, i.e., without the participation of chlorophyll (nitrifying bacteria, sulfur bacteria, iron bacteria). The basic condition for the existence of most animals is the presence of green plants. Green plants, although they are of considerable antiquity, even the most primitive of them (simple green algae) represent very complex organisms compared to bacteria. Obviously, the earliest organisms should be considered forms similar to bacteria, possessing the ability of chemosynthesis. However, they could have arisen only when relatively complex colloids already existed on earth. All that has been said about organisms refers to modern organisms; meanwhile, we must undoubtedly assume that before the even simplest forms known to us today, there must have existed forms that were not yet organisms, but were also not simply colloids. For a time, such a transitional form to an organism was considered the non-nuclear plasma, and it was even believed that among modern organisms a similar non-nuclear formation had been found (moneres of Haeckel). However, at present it is firmly established that all organisms, including bacteria and blue-green algae, possess nuclei or homologues thereof, although more primitive. Some biologists have sought primitive forms of organisms in special elementary 'life units'. The extreme viewpoint in this sense is the latest theory of the American geneticist H. Muller about the gene as the basis of life. Since the gene is an essential element of the nucleus and determines traits, the possibility of its independent existence is assumed, in proof of which the bacteriophage b. m. e. v. xxvii 51F d'Hérelle is cited. However, without speaking of the fact that the reality of the bacteriophage as an organism is still disputed, it is impossible to speak of the gene as an organism because its 'bodily' and physiological properties are completely unknown. We know that genes are determinants of the traits of organisms, but what they represent in relation to the traits of organisms—we do not know. Moreover, the same valid objections already mentioned against the doctrine of the cell as the unit of life are applicable to this theory. Primitive forms of life must have been devoid of many, if not all, of the cytological structures known to us. Furthermore, a number of properties of organisms must be considered as differently ancient: such properties as reproduction and irritability probably arose later than metabolism. It is completely certain that only a historical approach to organisms will allow us to penetrate into the essence of the structure and life activity of modern organisms, accessible in particular to experimental study. Having come to the conclusion that the basis of life activity is protein, that 'life is a form of existence of protein bodies,' Engels believed that a protein substance arose from inanimate nature, which as yet possessed no differentiation. The apparent absurdity—an organism without organization—actually represents a transition, a leap from inanimate matter to a primary organism. 'Just as we are forced to speak of invertebrate vertebrate animals, so here the unorganized, formless, undifferentiated protein lump is called an organism. Dialectically this is possible, because just as in the spinal cord lies the vertebral column, so in the first arisen protein lump lies in embryo, 'in itself' the entire infinite series of organisms.' This stage of development of organisms, in which the specific form, structure, organization is still 'in itself,' contains the prerequisites for the next leap. This leap consists in the isolation of individual parts of the protein lump, in particular the nucleus, nucleolus, and membrane. The protameba turns into an ameba. The qualitatively new process of morphogenesis could not have begun immediately after the formation of protein, but once begun, it transferred the phenomenon of life to a qualitatively new stage, with which the evolution of modern organisms actually began. 'Perhaps millennia passed until the conditions necessary for the next step forward were created, and from this formless protein there arose, through the formation of a nucleus and membrane, the first cell, but with this first cell the basis for morphogenesis of the entire organic world was also given.' The dialectical-materialist conception of the origin of organisms, developed by Engels, puts an end to the sterile disputes around Pasteur's experiments. The question of the origin of life, of the emergence of the first organisms, is freed from metaphysics, into which it so often falls. The hypothesis of 'eternity of life,' developed by Helmholtz and Arrhenius and so 'plausibly' depicting the transfer of germs to earth from other planets, is unconvincing despite all the arguments, including the reference to light pressure as a means of transferring germs in interplanetary space. This hypothesis postpones the solution of the question and leads to hylomorphism, which does not see in the life activity of organisms a specific form of motion of matter, arising from more primitive forms of motion as a result of the dialectical process of evolution of moving matter. No less metaphysical was the doctrine of the spontaneous generation of complex organisms. Aristotle considered it possible that snakes, lizards, and toads could arise from moist slime. In the Middle Ages, it was still considered possible that mice, insects, worms, and mollusks could arise spontaneously.'

This view held until the beginning of the 19th century. Then the circle of organisms capable of spontaneous generation was limited to the simplest forms, but even this idea could not be proven. The metaphysical character of such a doctrine of spontaneous generation lies in the misunderstanding of the basic dialectical law of development, which reduces to the fact that no new stage of development can be reached until all the prerequisites for its negation and transition to the next higher stage have arisen in the preceding stage. Of the stages of development of life, which are arranged in the sequence: dead matter-structureless protein possessing manifestations of life-organism, Engels says the following: "It would be absurd to wish to explain the origin of even a single cell directly from dead matter, and not from structureless living protein; it would be absurd to wish to force nature with the help of a small amount of foul water to do in 24 hours what required millennia of her." In modern biology, the methodological side of the problem of the organism as a specific object of natural science coincides with the methodology of biology as a whole. Aristotle considered the basic property of a living being to be its ability to move. The latter, in his opinion, can be understood from a dualistic point of view: there is matter that is set in motion - the body, and the source of motion - the soul. The body is the result of the activity of the soul, its product. The organism is thus an animated and therefore formed being that carries within itself its purpose. To the spiritualistic principle governing the life activity of the organism, Aristotle gave the name entelechy. This conception of the organism dominated science for almost 2,000 years, remaining to this day the basis of vitalistic views. Its antithesis was the doctrine of Descartes, who sought to exclude any teleological explanation of nature by applying the mechanical principle of external impulse as the cause of motion. The living organism, in Descartes' opinion, must also submit to this mechanical principle - this is the source of the concept of the 'animal-machine.' Only for the human organism does Descartes make an exception, endowing it with an immortal soul. Descartes' judgment of the organism as a machine was consistently crowned by the representation of God as the creator of this machine. Thus Descartes failed to avoid teleology; he only transferred the source of the purposiveness of the organism outward, endowing this source with divine attributes. However, another interpretation of the purposiveness of the organism, considering it an inalienable property of living things, often led to idealistic speculations. Engels in 'Anti-Dühring' wrote: 'Even the application of Hegel's 'inner purpose,' i.e., a purpose which is not introduced into nature by any consciously acting external agent, e.g., the wisdom of Providence, but which is contained in the very essence of the matter, constantly leads in people who have not gone through a good philosophical school to the meaningless imposition on nature of conscious, intentional activity.' The antiteleological tendencies of modern mechanistic biologists are well formulated by J. Loeb, who asserted that biology will become a true science only when it disappears as an independent science and becomes a department of physical chemistry. The subjective confidence of mechanists that with their views they are conducting a struggle with vitalism, the ancient enemy of materialist world outlook, encounters serious contradictions between the basic principle of the machine or physico-chemical theory of the organism and its inevitable consequences. It is not difficult to show that the concept of a machine contains no less teleological content than Aristotle's definition of the organism, because every machine is intended to perform a certain specific work, and its design, if the machine is good, corresponds in all details to its purpose. The concept of a machine inevitably requires the recognition of a rational builder of it, as well as a rational force directing its activity. Modern vitalism, as a system most fully developed by Driesch, understands the organism as a natural body sui generis. For Driesch the organism is above all a whole, which is characterized by specific regularities, whereas the parts of this whole are subordinate to it both in their development and origin and in their life activity. The factor of the whole that governs the organism is an elementary, irreducible goal-seeking factor, for which Driesch retains Aristotle's term 'entelechy.' In other cases Driesch calls this factor the 'psychoid,' meaning to say that it, if not a soul, can nevertheless be understood only through psychological analogies and thus has a non-material, even extra-spatial character. Entelechy acts on the material substrate of the organism, directing its impulses into space (in den Raum hinein). To the question 'from where,' Driesch of course gives no answer. It is necessary to note that the opposition of the machine and vitalistic understanding of life is not absolute. The machine theory, being a vulgar mechanistic materialism, however constantly uses concepts (e.g., adaptation, purposiveness, regulation, etc.) that go beyond the framework of its basic constructions. Vitalists try to 'save' the mechanistic conception of the organism by introducing non-material goal-directed forces such as entelechy, dominance, psychoids, vital impulse, etc. Idealism in biology is undoubtedly more consistent than mechanism, which positions itself against vitalism as a 'scientific' point of view. 'Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. On the contrary, from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, philosophical idealism is a one-sided development (inflation, swelling) of one of the features, aspects, sides of knowledge into an absolute, torn away from matter, from nature, deified' (Lenin). For both mechanists and vitalists, it is characteristic to strive to grasp the living being only analytically, by decomposing it into life units; the difference between these viewpoints lies in the fact that mechanists believe that their analysis and reduction of life to elementary physico-chemical processes is the end of knowledge, while vitalists build additional synthetic hypotheses about mystical, life-governing factors. In reality, however, the unit of life is not the cell and not the microscopic plasma structures (chromosomes, mitochondria, etc.), and not hypothetical microstructures' (biofores of Weismann, pangenes of de Vries, biogenes of Hertwig, protomers of Heidenhain), and not special chemical compounds (biogenes of Verworn), and not a complex or mixture of such compounds - the unit and bearer of life is the whole organism. In opposition to the machine theory of life, developed by both mechanists and vitalists, in the last decade the so-called 'structural theory,' or 'theory of form' ('Gestalttheorie'), was first applied (1919) in psychology, where it was opposed to the atomism of associative psychology. To the area of biological phenomena Gestalttheorie was first applied by its author W. Köhler and then supported by M. Hartmann, B. Fischer and a number of other bourgeois biologists. 'Gestalt' is characterized by properties that cannot be understood as the result of the summation of the properties of individual components; these properties are connected with the special arrangement of the components of the whole and disappear when the 'form' is violated. In accordance with the principles of the 'theory of form,' the physiologist Pütter defines life as 'a special kind of interaction of substances and processes, connected with their spatial and temporal arrangement.' Gestalttheorie is undoubtedly a step forward from vulgar materialism and vitalism to dialectical materialism. However, in further progress toward consistent materialism, the supporters of the 'theory of form' proved unable. In their generalizations they repeatedly fall into idealism. This deficiency is the result of most bourgeois scientists' unfamiliarity with Marxist methodology. Therefore, the 'theory of form,' which had set out on the right path, left the straight road and by detours returned to those original metaphysical views from which it had first sought to depart. Gestalttheorie split into two trends, one of which, under the name of 'theory of physical form,' returned to mechanism, while the other acquired an idealistic character. Among those who spontaneously approach the positions of dialectical materialism, it is necessary to mention the famous histologist M. Heidenhain. Heidenhain tries to substantiate a new science, synthetic morphology or 'syntheciology,' which he opposes to old anatomy as the art of dissection. Instead of the incorrect principle of the cell state, which is an attempt at a crude atomistic interpretation of the organism, Heidenhain proposes the theory of an ordered 'histosystem,' and in his opinion the organism has subordinate and dominating systems. The essence of the organism lies in the correlation of all its parts.'

In contrast to 'analytical' theories, which according to the views of vitalists and mechanists consider the Organism as a collection of separated series of processes, united either by an immaterial factor (vitalists) or as a mosaic of parts (mechanists), Heidenhain emphasizes the importance of correlational connections, the nature of which is determined by the specific structure of the Organism. In recent times, the integrity of the Organism is often understood mechanistically, and the source of correlational connections is considered to be certain centers of the Organism, for example, the nervous system or the endocrine glands. Such representations are based on the formal-logical division of the Organism into a collection of external parts to each other, one of which is arbitrarily declared the cause of the origin, preservation, and vital activity of the whole.